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Today, we are attempting to manage chaos. With the end of the Cold War, a
number of troubling developments in the world have been unleashed, especially with
the proliferation of WMD. Biological weapons are an increasing threat to world
security. Nations and non-state actors are willing to buy or sell necessary
technologies for the production of biological weapons which can have disastrous
effects on a military, an economy, and the environment. Despite major efforts in
reducing worldwide nuclear and chemical capable threats, biological weapons require
the same amount of attention if not more from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.
NATO must highlight the threat of biological warfare in current policies in order to
educate political, military, and civilian leaders on biological warfare issues, deter the
employment of biological weapons, and increase a sense of security within the
Alliance. For far too long, the intelligence communities within the Alliance have
definitely underestimated the biological programs of other nations and non-state
actors.
Refocusing the intelligence communities towards biological warfare will be of
an enormous advantage for the Alliance. Intelligence stems from the policies and
directives set forth by worldwide governments. New policies will enhance the efforts
of intelligence agencies and increase the awareness of the ominously growing
biological warfare threat. Hopefully, if policies change, then intelligence
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
In April 1949, the North Atlantic treaty created a dynamic Alliance of
independent states for the purpose of maintaining security and peace of its members.
The Alliance was an unqualified success, but with the end of the Cold War, the
Alliance is facing numerous challenges, especially from the rising proliferation of
WMD and the specific knowledge of how to produce them. Too many sovereign
states and individual groups are now willing to buy or sell the technologies necessary
to produce biological weapons which could have disastrous effects on military
institutions, a nation's economy, and the environment. WMD, along with the delivery
systems, create an enormous risk for the member states and their forces and constitute
a threat to international security. To provide the member states a stable security
environment, NATO must face this dreadful challenge head on.
Despite major efforts in reducing nuclear and chemical capable threats
throughout the world, biological weapons require the same amount of attention, if not
more, from the Alliance. Nuclear and chemical weapons seem to receive most of the
attention judging by publications and governmental policies while biological weapons
are just "mentioned" in passing. The Alliance's intelligence communities have
definitely underestimated the biological programs of other states and adversaries.
Two primary examples are the miscalculated Iraqi biological weapons program and
the Russian Biopreparat program.
When the Biological Weapons Convention was opened for signature in 1972,
four nations were suspected of developing offensive biological weapons. In 1992,
there were ten such nations. Now, there are 12 suspected nations actively involved
in the development of offensive biological weapons.
One reason why NATO should expand all efforts against biological warfare is
the potential hazards associated with biological agents. The world is battling against
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the rise of infectious diseases and the biological agents seem to be winning. As
nations or non-state actors observe the increasing problems created by biological
agents, they will realize that such agents are an outstanding weapon of choice. The
possession of biological agents for the use in biological weapons will have a direct
impact on worldwide operations. Nations and non-state actors have accessibility to
the necessary equipment for producing these agents and to the biological agents
themselves. NATO cannot underestimate any nation or non-state actor's ability to
develop biological weapons.
The second reason why NATO should expand all efforts against biological
warfare is the threat of terrorist group activities involving biological weapons. As
these dual use technologies spread throughout the world, the probability of biological
terrorism will only increase. The threat of biological terrorism is increasing. These
groups have illustrated their interest in all areas of biological agents, sophisticated
biological equipment, and delivery systems over the past three decades.
Challenging the proliferation of biological weapons requires an enormous
amount of attention from the Alliance. Many NATO platforms and forces could
easily be targeted or attacked with biological weapons during peacetime or wartime
operations. Refocusing the intelligence community towards biological warfare will
be a great advantage for the Alliance. Intelligence exists because of the policies and
directives established by worldwide governments. NATO must change its policies
towards biological warfare. Will it take an offensive employment of a biological
agent to include biological warfare in key documents? Or will it take mass casualties
from a biological attack? New policies would enhance the efforts of intelligence
agencies and increase the awareness of the biological warfare threat. If policies
change, then intelligence will refocus their efforts towards the new change: the
increasing threat of biological warfare.
I . INTRODUCTION
In April 1949, the North Atlantic treaty created a
dynamic Alliance of independent states for the purpose of
maintaining security and peace of its members. With the end
of the Cold War, the Alliance will face numerous challenges,
especially from the rising proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction (WMD) and the specific knowledge of how to
manufacture them. When states and individual groups are
willing to purchase or sell the technologies necessary to
manufacture biological weapons, devastating effects are
placed upon a military, an economy, and the environment.
Proliferating states only need a starter culture of an agent
to begin an offensive biological weapons program. WMD,
along with the delivery systems, creates an enormous risk
for the member states and their forces and constitutes a
threat to international security. To provide the member
states a stable security environment, NATO will have to
confront this dreadful challenge head on.
Despite major efforts in reducing nuclear and chemical
capable threats throughout the world, biological weapons
require the same amount of attention if not more from the
Alliance. Nuclear and chemical weapons seem to receive most
of the attention with publications while biological weapons
are just "mentioned" concerns. The intelligence communities
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within the Alliance have definitely underestimated the
biological programs of other states and adversaries. Two
primary examples include the miscalculated Iraqi biological
weapons programs and the Russian Biopreparat program.
Biological technologies have legitimate military or
civilian applications separate from WMD. As these dual use
technologies spread throughout the world, the probability of
biological terrorism will only increase. Since biological
weapons do not require infrastructures as costly as those
necessary to manufacture and maintain nuclear or even
chemical weapons, they become very attractive to other
states, terrorist groups, or even religious cults. A recent
example involves the Aum Shinrikyo Cult. In March 1995, the
attack on the Tokyo subway station by the Japanese cult
proved that WMD have extended the "battlefield" to the
civilian sector. This particular group has links with
10,000 members in Japan and 20,000 members in Russia and
North Korea. 1 Both Russia and North Korea are suspected
nations of developing offensive biological weapons. It has
also been reported that the Aum Shinrikyo cult has attempted
to obtain the Ebola virus as well as aircraft and drones as
Douglas Jr., Joseph D. "Chemical and Biological Warfare Unmasked", Wall Street
Journal November 2, 1995.
the delivery systems. 2 An incident like this one represents
a new dimension of terrorism and complicates the problem
with the proliferation of such terrifying weapons. Nations
have a hard enough time trying to control the increasing
cases of infectious diseases that have recently resurfaced:
TB, Meningitis, Cholera, and Ebola.
Challenging the proliferation of WMD requires enormous
attention from the Alliance, especially pertaining to
biological weapons. Many NATO platforms and forces could
easily be targeted or attacked with WMD during any peacetime
or wartime operations. The major concerns for the Alliance
are the increasing possibilities that surrounding states,
including the non-state actors, are trying to acquire or
develop WMD, the increasing worldwide trade of WMD systems,




When the Biological Weapons Convention was opened for
signature in 1972, four countries were suspected of
2Douglas Jr., Joseph D. "Chemical and Biological Warfare Unmasked", Wall Street
Journal . November 2, 1995.
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"Human capital" investment refers to a national investment in education in order to
increase the productivity of biological weapons. This includes sending students to other
countries, such as the United States, to study the biological sciences and genetic engineering or
acquiring highly trained graduates in the sciences from leading universities.
developing offensive biological weapons. 4 In 1992, there
were ten such countries. 5 Now, there are approximately 12
suspected countries actively involved in the development of
offensive biological weapons. 6 Some of these countries are
also members of the Convention on the Prohibition of the
Development, Production, and Stockpiling of Bacteriological
(Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction
(BTWC) . Russia, a member of the BTWC and the Partnership
for Peace program, is one of two countries, the other being
the United States, that is directed by the United Nations
Health Agency to eradicate the remaining stocks of smallpox
by June 30, 1999. 7 Will the Russians try to smuggle
smallpox samples out of their country or will they act as
directed?
NATO's current policies regarding ' WMD do not highlight
the increasing threat of biological weapons. NATO must
recognize changes of the environment in order to offer new
ideas, enforce their views against the proliferation of
4GAO Report. Arms Control: U.S. and International Efforts to Ban Biological Weapons .
(Washington, DC: United States General Accounting Office, December 1992), 16.
5GAO Report Arms Control: U.S. and International Efforts to Ban Biological Weapons .
(Washington, DC: United States General Accounting Office, December 1992), 16.
6
Tucker, Jonathan B. "Strengthening the Biological Weapons Convention", Arms Control
Today . Vol. 25, No 3. (Washington, DC: Arms Control Association, April 1995), 9.
Associated Press. "Health Agency Agrees to Eradicate Smallpox", Monterey Co. Herald .
May 25, 1996.
biological weapons within the NATO publications, and take
the lead in strengthening the BTWC. NATO's strategic
concept provides guidance for its members and their forces.
Nuclear and chemical weapons have had the spotlight in
recent policies. Now, NATO must enlarge concepts pertaining
to biological weapons. Will it take an offensive employment
of a biological agent to include biological weapons in
important documents? Or will it take mass casualties from a
biological attack? There are many challenges facing NATO
regarding the employment of biological weapons to include
the threat of proliferation of WMD and advanced conventional
weapons to deter the employment of biological weapons. NATO
must establish a proactive stand against the proliferation
of such weapons. Preventing the proliferation of WMD must
remain a primary goal for NATO, but biological weapons have
to be specifically highlighted as well.
Current intelligence assets and non-proliferation
regimes are mainly focused on nuclear and chemical weapons
proliferation. NATO must publicly highlight views
concerning biological warfare in order to educate the
community on biological weapons issues, deter the employment
of biological weapons, and increase a sense of security
within the Alliance. Biological warfare issues create
policy and security concerns on a global scale. When
policies indicate a higher concern towards biological
weapons, intelligence agencies will increase their efforts
in this particular area as well.
This thesis will prove that NATO members must refocus
their policy efforts regarding biological warfare. NATO, a
central distribution point of a multinational organization,
has the opportunity to educate the world in the challenge
against biological warfare. To accomplish this task, the
thesis will: (1) examine current NATO policies and explore
the challenges NATO will encounter regarding WMD, (2)
examine the potential threats of biological agents, (3)
explore the possibility of terrorist or religious
organizations that may employ biological weapons in support
of their activities, and (4) -determine the implications and
analysis of biological warfare to the intelligence community
to include an unclassified data base of biological events
which can provide indications and warnings of future
biological weapon events.
Biological weapons are an increasing threat to world
security. These weapons of mass destruction can have
devastating effects on military and civilian communities as
well as the environment. If a nation or terrorist group has
the knowledge to produce the agent, the facility to develop
the agent, and the delivery system to transfer the agent,
then that nation or terrorist group has the ability and
capability to produce biological weapons. When a nation or
terrorist group illustrates the willingness and capability
to use biological weapons, then that nation or terrorist
group is a world security threat. Intelligence exists
because of policies set forth by our government and foreign
governments. If policies change, then intelligence
organizations will refocus their efforts towards the new
areas of concern. NATO can set the example and lead the
fight against biological warfare.

II. NATO's POLICIES TOWARD BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
Although the Alliance faces significant international
changes, the purpose of maintaining the security and peace
of its members must remain intact. With the end of the Cold
War, the Alliance encounters numerous challenges, especially
from the rising proliferation of WMD and the specific
knowledge of producing them. According to Article 5 of the
Washington Treaty, NATO has a vital responsibility to "deter
and defend against any threat of aggression against the
territory of a NATO member state". 8 WMD, along with the
delivery systems, create an enormous risk for the member
states and their forces and constitute a threat to
international security. Nations and various other groups
with WMD can easily generate political or humanitarian
disasters. As President Clinton stated in his speech to the
United Nations on September 27, 1993:
8
Schulte, Gregory L "Responding to Proliferation: NATO's Role", NATO Review July
1995. p. 15.
For, as we all know so painfully, the end of the
Cold War did not bring us to the millennium of
peace. Indeed, it simply removed the lid from
many cauldrons of ethnic, religious, and
territorial animosity ... Thus, as we marvel at
this era' s promise of new peace, we must also
recognize that serious threats remain. . .As WMD
fall into more hands, even small conflicts can
threaten to take on murderous proportions. 9
The world is now more complicated, less predictable, and
more dangerous than the days of the Cold War. The Alliance
must magnify all efforts against the proliferation of WMD
and their means of delivery. To provide the member states a
stable security environment in Europe and North America,
NATO will have to face this horrifying challenge.
A. CURRENT POLICIES REGARDING THE BIOLOGICAL WARFARE THREAT
To challenge the proliferation of WMD while preserving
a sense of security for the Alliance, NATO has developed
three policies: (1) Alliance's New Strategic Concept, (2)
Alliance's Policy Framework on Proliferation of Weapons of
Mass Destruction, and (3) NATO's Response to Proliferation
of Weapons of Mass Destruction. Although these policies
address the proliferation of WMD, they only highlight
nuclear and chemical weapons as the primary elements of
international stability and cooperative security.
9
Clinton cited in Pearson, Graham S. "Forging An Effective Biological Weapons
Regime", Arms Control Today . Vol. 24, No. 5. (Washington, DC: Arms Control Association,
June 1994), 14.
10
Biological weapons seem to be hidden within the WMD phrase.
Since WMD includes nuclear, chemical, and biological
weapons, biological weapons cannot be viewed as "mentioned"
concerns. The threat of biological weapons is increasing.
NATO' s policies must expand concepts pertaining to
biological weapons to reflect the current changes in the
proliferation arena.
The Chinese have a saying that ^change is a
dragon.' There are ways to respond to that dragon.
You can ignore him and hope he goes away, but no
matter how many times you tell yourself that he is
not there or how much you wish he would leave, the
dragon that is change remains. If you continue to
ignore him, he will eat you. You can try to
control the dragon of change, try to force him into
a path of your choosing. Push him and pull him.
But the dragon is powerful and will not go where
you want him to go. He will ultimately knock you
down and eat you. But if you ride the dragon of
change, you can avoid his lethal powers. You can
survive; you can even prosper. Accept change;
constantly anticipate and adapt to it; and always
take advantage of the opportunities it brings.
This is the strategy we must embrace. 10
NATO represents more than a central distribution point for
the development of policies that preserve the sense of
security of the Alliance. NATO's policies extend well
beyond the Alliance's boundaries. The changing environment
offers new opportunities for the Alliance. The threats of
biological warfare require the same amount of attention that
10General Charles C. Krulak, Commandant of the United States Marine Corps, cited in
Sparling, Steven C. "Riding the Dragon of Change", Surface Warfare . Vol. 21, No. 4. (United
States: Harmony Printing & Development Company, July/August 1996), 4.
11
nuclear and chemical warfare receives within NATO policies.
The Alliance' s New Strategic Concept takes a broad
approach to security based on three concepts: (1) dialogue
through regular diplomatic liaison, (2) cooperation with all
members regarding pertinent fields of security, and (3)
collective defense through the preservation of appropriate
military capabilities. It illustrates the concern for
reducing the dependence on nuclear weapons, increasing the
integration of multinational military forces, controlling
conventional forces, and banning against chemical weapons.
The policy portrays the functions of the Alliance and
validates the significance of the Alliance within the
changing environment.
The major problem with the Alliance' s New Strategic
Concept is that it does not include the threat of biological
weapons. WMD within the Alliance' s New Strategic Concept
seem to involve only nuclear and chemical weapons. Not once
does this particular document mention biological weapons.
It only "hides" this type of warfare within the WMD phrase.
This is totally unsatisfactory, especially when the document
clearly separates nuclear and chemical warfare. Will it
take an offensive employment of a biological agent to
include biological weapons in important documents such as
this one? Or will it take mass casualties from a biological
12
attack? These questions might be simplistic in nature, but
NATO must establish a proactive stand against the
proliferation of such weapons. Preventing the proliferation
of WMD must remain a primary goal for NATO, but biological
weapons have to be specifically highlighted as well and not
just taken for granted.
Knowing the threat of WMD creates a sense of
instability in international security, the Alliance has
established a Policy Framework on Proliferation of Weapons
of Mass Destruction and NATO's Response to Proliferation of
WMD. These policies recognize that the proliferation of WMD
is an international security threat, acknowledge the fact
that other nations are striving to acquire the technologies
to produce WMD, and realize that the Alliance must increase
political and defensive efforts against the proliferation of
WMD. The major problem with the Policy Framework on
Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and the NATO's
Response to Proliferation of WMD is that they seem to focus
upon the proliferation of ballistic type weapons as delivery
systems. Ballistic weapons are not the only delivery
systems for biological agents. Biological agents can be
delivered by various aerosol sprayers, artillery, and
aircraft. This policy cannot focus upon one type of
delivery system. There are many other delivery systems
13
nations can use towards the employment of biological
weapons
.
Politically, the goal is to "prevent proliferation from
occurring or, should it occur, to reverse it through
diplomatic means". 1 '* This means regular consultations on
WMD and sharing of information between all countries
associated with the Alliance. Dialogue will - it is hoped -
establish a sense of obligation needed to fight against the
proliferation of WMD. Biological weapons create problems
with verification, but with regular consultations and
information sharing, the Alliance will come closer to
verification capabilities leading to a more comprehensive
and affective non proliferation effort.
The problem with the political dimension of the
Alliance is that not all members voluntarily share
information. 12 All members of NATO must share information
on their various advances in the biological arena in order
to pursue the necessary knowledge of biological warfare and
to support the safe and secure dismantlement of biological
weapon facilities. Since there are members of the Alliance
nNATO Press Release , "Alliance Policy Framework on Proliferation ofWeapons ofMass
Destruction" (Brussels: NATO Press Service, June 9, 1994), 3-4.
12Statement is based upon Dr. Marcel Leroy's lecture, "European Security and Defense
Identity: NATO, the WEU, and the European Union", on January 24, 1996 at the Naval
Postgraduate School. Dr. Leroy has been the Head, Multilateral and Regional Affairs Political
Affairs Division, NATO Headquarters: Brussels, Belgium since January 1991.
14
that do not have the political fortitude to share this
valuable biological information, the Alliance should make it
a mandatory action. If members withhold information, those
members should be "politically embarrassed". To challenge
the dreadful threat of biological warfare, all members of
the Alliance must make a major effort. Exchanges of all
types of information elevates the educational awareness for
the entire organization. When the Alliance collectively
contributes information towards biological warfare, a
commonality of thinking towards biological warfare will be
created. A lackadaisical effort towards biological warfare
will haunt every member of the Alliance, not just the
members who do not offer information.
Although all NATO members have signed and ratified the
BTWC, not all of the Partnership for Peace (pfp) members are
listed as countries who have signed and ratified this
particular document. 13 The seven countries not listed
include: Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,
Latvia, Lithuania, and Moldova. 14 The Partnership for Peace
program was created to increase the confidence and
cooperation efforts to reinforce security, build concrete
13See Appendix A for a copy of the BTWC.
14These countries are not listed within the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency's
Chemical and Biological Weapons Reader Fact Sheet. March 1996.
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cooperation activities designed to achieve objectives, and
strengthen relations with NATO. 15 This cannot be achieved
if there are members of the pfp who have not signed and
ratified the BTWC.
If the aforementioned countries wish to become NATO
"partners", they should also sign and ratify the BTWC for
the support of non-proliferation of such WMD and for world
security. Countries with previous ties with the Soviet
Union might have had extensive biological warfare
experience. Inspections of these countries or assessments
of the their biological weapons knowledge could improve
current policies.
Defensively, NATO seeks military capabilities to deter
the use or proliferation of WMD and defend the Alliance's
territory and forces. A problem with NATO's defensive
measure is that it needs more emphasis on protecting the
troops from a biological attack. This includes protective
equipment, detection devices, decontamination procedures,
and biological warfare training.
Weapons of mass destruction - nuclear, biological,
and chemical - along with their associated
delivery systems, pose a major threat to our
security and that of our allies and other friendly
nations. Thus, a key part of our strategy is to
seek to stem the proliferation of such weapons
and to develop an effective capability to deal
15NATO Handbook . (Brussels: NATO Office of Information and Press, 1995), 50.
16
with these threats. 16
Improving these capabilities, from a collective aspect, will
increase the understanding of biological warfare and
establish a more protective environment for the troops
against a biological threat.
Similar to NATO's policies towards biological warfare,
the defensive measures focus upon the maintenance of nuclear
and conventional warfare. Higher priorities need to be
associated with biological warfare. Since the threat of
biological warfare is not highlighted within NATO's
policies, NATO's leaders and military commanders will not
place adequate biological warfare training for the troops.
The Persian Gulf War clearly illustrates the inadequate
defenses, lack of training, and medical imperfections
towards a biological attack within the first six months of
the conflict. 17 These troops were highly susceptible to any
biological attack from the Iraqi troops. These insufficient
defenses against biological attacks during the Persian Gulf
War were results of an "inconsistent and lower priority"
16The White House was cited in A National Security Strategy ofEngagement and
Enlargement
.
(Washington, DC: White House Press, February 1995), 13.
17GAO Report. Chemical and Biological Defense: Emphasis Remains Insufficient to
Resolve Continuing Problems
.
(Washington, D.C.: United States General Accounting Office,
March 12, 1996), 1.
17
assignments towards biological defenses. 18 The troops are
extensions of NATO policies. The leaders of the Alliance
cannot afford to allow biological warfare take the lives of
military personnel who are providing the security and
freedom for other members of NATO.
Major efforts to reduce nuclear and chemical threats
throughout the world have been undertaken. Jointly pursued
political and defensive measures will heighten awareness of
the need to take action against the proliferation of WMD.
Biological weapons require the same amount of attention, if
not more, from the Alliance. NATO cannot afford to be
complacent with the increasing threat of biological weapons.
The use of biological weapons dates back to over two
thousand years ago when contaminated bodies were used
against their adversaries. 19 If certain countries express a
willingness to incorporate biological weapons in their
military operations, NATO's defensive military operations
may be directly affected. NATO must be able to protect its
forces and destroy biological facilities to defend against
any biological attacks. The number of countries capable of
18GAO Report. Chemical and Biological Defense: Emphasis Remains Insufficient to
Resolve Continuing Problems . (Washington, DC: United States General Accounting Office,
March 12, 1996), 1.
19Kupperman, Robert H. And David M. Smith. "Coping With Biological Terrorism",
Biological Weapons: Weapons of the Future ? Vol. 15, No. 1. (Washington, DC: The Center
For Strategic and International Studies, 1993), 37.
18
using biological weapons is increasing. When nations signed
the BTWC in 1972, there were only four countries with
biological weapons programs. 20 In 1992, there were ten
countries. 21 Now, there at least 12 countries suspected of
having offensive biological weapons programs. 22 NATO must
install the realistic threat of biological weapons to the
members of the Alliance in order to refocus intelligence
efforts towards biological warfare.
B. CHALLENGES FACING NATO
1 . Deterrence of Biological Weapons
The deterrence of biological weapons use creates a
problem for the Alliance. To deter another nation from
using such weapons, the defending nation must establish the
capability and the willingness to utilize its own weapon
systems against the enemy forces. The defending nation must
develop and use highly effective defensive or offensive
weapon systems that would make biological weapons
ineffective. Some possible deterrent strategies include:
(1) threatening to use biological weapons to deter the
20GAO Report. Arms Control: U.S. and International Efforts to Ban Biological
Weapons
. (Washington, DC: United States General Accounting Office, December 1992), 16.
21
Ibid.
22Tucker, Jonathan B. "Strengthening the Biological Weapons Convention", Arms
Control Today
.
Vol. 25, No. 3. (Washington, D.C.: Arms Control Association, April 1995), 9.
19
employment of biological weapons, (2) threatening to use
advanced conventional weapons to deter the employment of
biological weapons, (3) threatening with a large scale
conventional attack to deter the employment of biological
weapons, and (4) threatening to use nuclear weapons to deter
the employment of biological weapons. Neighboring states of
the Alliance could use deterrence strategies not supported
by the Alliance.
Prior to 1972 when President Nixon decided to abolish
all U.S. biological and toxin weapons, the United States
developed biological agents to deter the employment of
biological agents by other countries. 23 Although the United
States eliminated all biological and toxin weapons from its
arsenals, other nations will continue to develop biological
weapons. Since nations have noticed the difficulties of
accurately pinpointing violations of the BTWC, the
biological weapon is a perfect weapon for those who have or
have not signed and ratified the BTWC. Although potential
hazards associated with biological weapons exist,
technological advances in biological warfare are increasing
which enable other countries to "maximize storability,
23
Bailey, Kathleen. "Deterrence of Biological Weapons", Draft . (California: Lawrence
Livermore National Laboratory, September 6, 1995), 1.
20
lethality, and survivability" of biological agents. 24
Another method of deterrence is increasing the amount
of conventional weapons. If countries can produce and
threaten with a substantial amount of advanced conventional
weapons, they might be able to deter others from employing
biological weapons. 25 Extensive manpower capabilities with
advanced conventional weapons could present an overwhelming
picture towards the enemy with biological weapons. Although
the increase of advanced conventional weapon systems is a
costly investment and could place more lives in danger, this
is an option for countries that do not want to take chances
with biological agents, especially countries that have
signed and ratified the BTWC. But other nations might not
be able to afford large amounts of troops or do not have the
technological expertise required for such weapon systems
which results in possibly choosing another weapon: the
biological weapon.
Establishing a threat with a nuclear capability to
deter the employment of biological weapons is a costly
investment, but has proven to be very effective - at least
24
Bailey, Kathleen. "Deterrence of Biological Weapons", Draft . (California: Lawrence




in some cases. 26 The Persian Gulf War is a perfect example.
Iraq admitted to preparing biological weapons for employment
against U.S. and coalition forces, but decided not to use
these weapons for "fear of U.S. nuclear retaliation". 27 One
of NATO's defensive measures involves maintaining minimum
levels of nuclear weapons to "preserve peace and prevent war
or any kind of coersion". 28 This defensive measure only
encourages other nations to establish nuclear capabilities.
To deter biological weapon attacks while avoiding any
violations of the BTWC, nations could decide to invest in
nuclear weapons.
Proliferation of nuclear weapons to deter the
employment of biological weapons has downfalls. First,
proliferation of nuclear weapons causes a weakening of the
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) . From fear of
increasing biological weapon capabilities, countries
currently without nuclear weapons may not want to rely on
the security commitments of the Alliance and may want to
initiate their own nuclear weapon capabilities for the sake
of defending themselves. Future scenarios could easily
26
Bailey, Kathleen. "Deterrence of Biological Weapons", Draft . (California: Lawrence
Livermore National Laboratory, September 6, 1995), 2.
27Arms Control Today . "Iraq Provides IAEA With Significant New Information". Vol.
25, No. 7. (Washington, DC: Arms Control Association, September 1995), 27.
28NATO Handbook . (Brussels: NATO Office of Information and Press, 1995), 41-42.
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involve executive decisions on utilizing nuclear weapons
against nations without nuclear weapons which would initiate
strong opposing views. Second, the proliferation of nuclear
weapons could also cause an increase demand for nuclear
weapons with smaller yield ratios. For example, the U.S.
arsenal is comprised mostly of weapons with yields of 5KT
designed for massive destruction of the former Soviet
Union. jy These weapons are not necessary against smaller
nations
.
Deterrence is a complex subject that every nation must
face. With the threat of biological weapons, nations will
develop weapon systems to protect themselves. The non-state
actors, on the other hand, do not sign or ratify treaties so
they will acquire whatever means possible to protect their
interests
.
2 . Strengthening the BTWC
Nations have supported the BTWC based upon three
assumptions: (1) biological weapons were not perceived to be
a viable weapon option, (2) production of large quantities
in a relatively short time was assumed to be technologically
difficult and beyond the capabilities of many states, and
(3) developed states that could produce such weapons already
29
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Livermore National Laboratory, September 6, 1995), 5.
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have access to nuclear systems to deter the nuclear,
chemical, and biological threats. 30 The world changes
constantly and these past assumptions are no longer valid.
Iraq as well as non-state actors, such as the Japanese Aum
Shinrikyo cult, view biological weapons as viable weapons.
Some nations seek a biological weapon capability as a
strategic WMD - "poor man's atomic bomb" and as an equalizer
against major powers like the United States. 31 Non-state
actors are acquiring the technological requirements for
biological capabilites. And the increasing biological
weapons threat could encourage nations to develop other than
nuclear weapons systems to deter the employment of
biological weapons. The increasing advances in the
biological sciences and the potential applications for these
advantages illustrate the need to strengthen the BTWC to
reflect current scenarios. NATO must commit themselves in
strengthening the BTWC as a critical element of the global
non-proliferation regime covering nuclear, chemical, and
biological weapons.
The changed environment offers new opportunities for
30
Latter, Dr. Richard. "The Increased Danger of Biological Weapons Proliferation", Jane's
Intelligence Review
. (United Kingdom: Huntcard Litho, February 1994), 93.
31
Tucker, Jonathan B. "Strengthening the Biological Weapons Convention", Arms
Control Today . Vol. 25, No. 3. (Washington, D.C.: Arms Control Association, April 1995), 9-
10.
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NATO to strengthen the BTWC. There are nine areas that can
assist nations in improving the BTWC:
(a) With new technological advances in biological sciences,
nations must reaffirm that the creation of biological agents
or toxins, by any means, for weapons is not justified under
the BTWC for military purposes or protection from possible
enemy employment of biological agents. Nations must have a
definition on the amounts of biological agents allowed for
"prophylatic, protective, or other peaceful purposes".
(b) As nations destroy biological weapon facilities or
shift to peaceful purposes, nations should conduct these
processes through a standardized list of actions which is
constantly reviewed after each case in order to provide the
necessary protection of the local population and
environment. This will also encourage nations to work more
closely in the biological field.
(c) All members of the BTWC need to enforce domestic
legislation making it a crime for their citizens to develop,
produce, stockpile, or acquire biological or toxin agents or
weapons. This could deter non-state actors from acquiring
biological agents or weapons.
(d) Nations should submit a semi-annual report that
includes updates of all domestic facilities (government,
commercial, or private) as well as inputs from experts on
strengthening measures for the BTWC.
(e) If nations have questions concerning a particular
facility or program, then these nations should have the
right to inquire about the facilities or programs.
(f) Nations should give advanced notice on military
training exercises in biologicial warfare defenses. This
would encourage joint operations in preparations for
possible threats to military forces.
(g) Routine inspection team training exercises must be
conducted in order to influence improvements in inspection
techniques. This would also enhance research in developing
improved detection devices for small quantities of agents.
(h) In order to assist inspection teams, all facilities
must be required to keep updated records (names,
25
organizational charts, medical records, accident reports,
project reports, and lessons learned reports). Not only
will this assist the inspection teams, but it could also
improve the organization of other facilities.
(i) All nations must monitor human capital investments.
Only a small number of knowledgeable people are needed to
produce biological agents for weapons. Iraq claims its
programs only consisted of ten people. 32
Although these measures can present problems with the
pharmaceutical or bio-technology industries, biological
agents and their potential users or applications is a very
serious matter which should not be taken lightly.
Biological weapons could be used by countries or terrorist
groups against NATO civilian or military personnel as well
as installations to deter NATO force involvement in a
particular state affair or even to increase a status quo.
Cases like the outbreak of anthrax in Sverdlovsk and
the Russian Biopreparat program create a concern about the
effectiveness of the BTWC. Strengthening the BTWC must be a
high priority for the members of NATO. The attractiveness
of such weapons will only increase if NATO does not take an
active role. Instituting sanctions against those countries
who do not report "high contaminated biological facilities"
or "unusual outbreaks" will increase participation.
International sharing of information or intelligence
32
Bailey, Kathleen. "Responding to the Threat of Biological Weapons", Security
Dialogue . Vol.26. (Livermore, California: Sage Publications, 1995), 386.
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gathering methods could improve measures against the threat
of biological warfare. The practice of utilizing all
available information and methods in creating the final
intelligence product will increase the likelihood of
successful inspections. The unveiling of the Biopreparat
program is an example. 33
Dealing with the proliferation of WMD requires enormous
attention from the Alliance, especially pertaining to
biological weapons. Many NATO platforms, forces, bases,
ports, and cities could easily be targeted and attacked with
WMD during any peacetime or wartime operations. The
Alliance must take steps to diminish the advantages that
biological weapons offer its adversaries. The increasing
possibilities that surrounding states and non-state actors
are trying to acquire or develop WMD, the increasing
worldwide trade in WMD systems, and the increasing "human
capital" investments for WMD technical expertise (notably in
the former Soviet Union) remain major concerns for the
Alliance
.
To improve NATO's protective capabilities, the Alliance
must to proactive. NATO cannot afford to let threats of
biological warfare weaken the sense of security among its
members. NATO must enforce and exemplify a strong
33The Russian Biopreparat program will be discussed in Chapter V.
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commitment to security so that it weakens any threat of
biological warfare. This could be done by improving
intelligence gathering techniques, examining biological
security matters frequently in publications, and
strengthening the BTWC.
NATO must take the lead to strengthen the BTWC and
enforce its views against the proliferation of biological
weapons within the Alliance ' s New Strategic Concept and
other NATO policies such as Alliance' s Policy Framework on
Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and NATO's
Response to Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction.
This can only increase the sense of security and confidence
needed when tackling this complex issue. The Alliance ' s New
Strategic Concept provides guidance for the forces and the
member states. Nuclear and chemical weapons have the
spotlight. Now the spotlight needs to be directed towards
biological weapons.
28
III. BIOLOGICAL AGENTS AS WARFARE THREATS
One reason why NATO should magnify all efforts against
the proliferation of biological weapons and their means of
delivery is the potential hazards of biological agents.
Although most researchers study biological agents for
medical or peaceful purposes, some researchers develop
biological agents or use existing biological agents for the
purpose of creating biological warfare programs. 34 Nations
or non-state actors with the knowledge of biological agents,
the equipment to produce biological agents, biological
agents themselves, and the delivery systems to transport
biological agents to a desired location are threats to the
international security. These agents cannot be viewed as
just military threats. Biological agents have the potential
to cause military, political, economic, and environmental
insecurities throughout the world.
As biotechnology advances, the threat of biological
warfare increases. Normal microorganisms are now being
modified for the purposes of biological warfare. Worldwide
outbreaks could actually be a biological attack or
biological test site. Improvements in biotechnology and the
34The definition of biological warfare is the use of living organisms or by-products of
organisms to cause death or incapacitation in man, animals, or plants for military, terrorist,
economic, or environmental purposes.
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dual use nature of these agents and related equipment will
encourage some nations or groups to initiate biological
programs and risk any violations of the BTWC. Since the
research of biological agents can be masqueraded as
defensive programs .and the ability to identify an offensive
biological warfare program is extremely difficult, illicit
activities will only increase.
George W. Merck, special consultant for biological
warfare, once stated:
The development of agents for biological warfare
is possible in many countries, large and small,
without vast expenditures of money or the
construction of huge production facilities. It
is clear that the development of biological
warfare could very well proceed in many countries,
perhaps under the guise of legitimate medical or
bacteriological research. 35
The breakup of the former Soviet Union could have easily
released a large amount of technical and educational
abilities on the world market. Resources for biological
programs are available. Nations or non-state actors choose
biological weapons for the following reasons:
(a) The need to deter the employment of other weapons
systems, influence political or military aspects of
potential enemies, or develop a status quo;
35George W. Merck cited in Geissler, Erhard. Biological and Toxin Weapons Today .
(Stockhom International Peace Research Institute: Oxford University Press, 1986), 1-2. G.W.
Merck also headed the War Research Service in the 1940's.
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(b) Potential biological warfare agents are domestically or
internationally available from manufacturers or natural
resources;
(c) Sophisticated R&D programs are unnecessary to develop
biological agents for weapon purposes;
(d) Information on producing biological agents and required
personnel for developing these agents are available
worldwide;
(e) Small scale facilities are capable of producing large
quantities of biological agents;
(f) It is relatively cheap to develop a biological warfare
program;
(g) The delay of symptoms causes difficulties to identify
the exact time and location of an initial attack;
(h) Biological agents have the capabilities to produce
large amounts of causualties in a relatively short period of
time with minimal material damage; and
(i) Detection devices are unreliable.
NATO must directly deal with the threat of biological
weapons. Pentagon officials from the United States claim
that "people inside and outside the Pentagon look away and
say 'it's too hard, too horrible' to deal with the threat of
biological weapons .. .We ' re not doing enough." 36 Since
biological agents have the potential to become a biological
weapon threat, they should not be taken lightly. NATO must
make the necessary policy adjustments to address the
changing environment.
36Weiner, Tim. "Weapons ofMass Destruction Are Spreading, Pentagon Warns", New
York Times
. April 12, 1996
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A. BIOLOGICAL AGENTS AND CAPABILITIES
Biological warfare agents can have strategic or
tactical missions. 37 They can be employed for the purpose
of incapacitating the enemy with a disease or causing a
large guantity of deaths with another disease. These agents
have the capability to be tremendous hazards to every
nation. Lethal dosages of biological agents only range from
1CT 3 to 10~ 8 mg per person and toxins range from 1 to 10" 4 mg
per person. 38 These are much smaller amounts when compared
to chemical agents. Nations must realize the lethality of
these agents in their natural state. Once these agents fall
37Types of biological warfare agents include: Bacteria : single cell organisms that are the
causative agents of anthrax, brucellosis, tularemia, plague, and numerous other diseases. They
vary considerably in infectivity and lethality. They are present within air, water, animals, plants,
living or dead. Rickettsiae : microorganisms that resemble bacteria in form and structure but differ
in that they are intracellular parasites that can reproduce inside animal cells, especially in fertilized
chicken eggs. Examples of rickettsia diseases for biological warfare include typhus, Rocky
Mountain spotted fever, and Q fever. Virus : intracellular parasites that are approximately 100
times smaller than bacteria. They can infect humans, crops, or domestic animals. A virus's
strength can be altered to increase efficiency. A particularly powerful strain of an endemic
pathogen could simply be blamed on a natural mutation. An example of a virus for biological
warfare is Venezuelan Equine Encephalitis. Fungi : devastating to plants and might be used to
destroy staple crops and cause widespread environmental and economic hardships. Examples
include rice blast, corn smut, cereal and wheat rust, and potato blight. Toxin : poisonous
substance made by a living system, or a synthetic analogue of a naturally occurring poison. An
large variety of toxins are manufactured from bacteria, fungi, marine organisms, plants, insects,
spiders, and other animals. This information was cited in The Chemical and Biological Weapons
Threat . (Washington DC: Nonproliferation Center, March 1996), 16-17.
38
U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Technologies Underlying Weapons of
Mass Destruction . OTA-BP-ISC-1 15 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office,
December 1993), 77. One paper clip weighs approximately 500 mg.
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into more "unfriendly" hands, the world could be in grave
danger.
Infectious diseases, caused by biological agents,
throughout the world are steadily increasing and killing
more people than in the past. 39 These diseases are actually
defending themselves against previously used antibiotics and
have become the third leading killer in the United States. 40
In the United States, the death rate from infectious
diseases rose 58% between 1980 to 1992 and without AIDS, the
death rate rose 22%. 41 Cases of cholera, tuberculosis,
diphtheria, and bubonic plague have all increased in the
last five years. 42 According to Joshua Lederberg, "The
world is more vulnerable than ever before". 43 Worldwide
medicine is fighting with the rise of infectious diseases
and the biological agents seem to be winning. As nations or
non-state actors observe the increasing problems created by
39
Associated Press. "Doctors Tell of International Resurgence in a Variety of Infectious




Hanley, Charles J. "Infectious Diseases Making Comeback", Monterey County Herald
Tribune . May 5, 1996.
42Howe, Peter J. "Infectious Disease Rate Soars in U.S.", Monterey County Herald
Tribune
. January 8, 1996.
43Joshua Lederberg cited in "Doctors Tell of International Resurgence in a Variety of
Infectious Diseases", New York Times . January 17, 1996 Dr Lederberg is a geneticist, Nobel
laureate, and president emeritus of Rockefeller University.
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the biological agents, they will realize that biological
agents are proving to be an outstanding weapon of choice.
Major emphasis must be placed upon the emerging problems
before they become worldwide crisis.
Appendix B illustrates a history of biological events
that the world has encountered. 44 In the current decade,
the world has faced Yellow Fever, Hantaan Virus,
Cryptosporidios, Machupo Virus, Ebola Virus (Zaire &
Reston) , Meningitis, Cyclospora, and 0157:H7 outbreaks.
These outbreaks have caused millions of deaths and
sicknesses, psychological problems, loss of millions of
dollars, closings of athletic events, shortening of vacation
and pilgrimage trips, and even closings of schools. Policies
have to highlight biological agents as warfare issues before
biological agents conquer the world.
Table 1 illustrates the list of organisms with
potential biological warfare applications. The highlighted
areas of this particular table indicate the organisms that
have surfaced since 1970. Eight of these organisms have
resurfaced within the current decade. Table 2 illustrates
animal pathogens with potential biological warfare
44The historical biological data base is an unclassified document illustrating the date of the
event, a short description of the event, the biological agent involved, whether the event was a
military, environmental, or terrorist event, and additional remarks to include the number of deaths
involved in the event.
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applications. The highlighted pathogen in Table 2
resurfaced in a terrorist situation in 1984. Table 3
illustrates a warning list of other organisms with potential
biological warfare applications. The highlighted areas of
Table 3 indicate the organisms that have surfaced since
1961. Two of these organisms have resurfaced within the
current decade. The world needs to wake up and seriously
challenge this issue of biological agent threats before more
innocent people and animals are killed or incapacitated.
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Table 1: List of Organisms with Potential Bioio »ical Warfare Applications
VIRUSES RICKETTSIAE BACTERIA TOXINS




Rickettsia Quintana Brucella Abortus Clostridium Perfringens
Toxins
Dengue Fever Virus Rickettsia Provvasecki Brucella Melitensis Conotoxin
Eastern Equine
Encephalitis Virus
Rickettsia Rickettsii Brucella Suis Ricin
Ebola Virus Chlamydia Psittaci Saxitoxin
Hantaan Virus Clostridium Botulinum Shiga Toxm
Junin Virus Francisella Tularensis Staphylococcus Aureus
Toxins







Machupo Virus Salmonella Typhi Microcystin (Cyanginosin)
Marburg Virus Shigella Dysenteriae
















Source: The Chemical and Biological Warfare Threat (Washington, DC: U.S.
Government, 1995), 33
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Table 2: Animal Pathogens with Potential Biological Warfare Applications
VIRUSES BACTERIA
African Swine Fever Virus Mycoplasma Mycoides
Avian Influenza Virus (only those of high
pathogenicity)
Bluetongue Virus
Foot and Mouth Disease Virus
Goat Pox Virus




Peste des Petits Ruminants Virus





Source: The Chemical and Biological Warfare Threat . (Washington, D.C.: U.S.
Government, 1995), 34.
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Source: The Chemical and Biological Warfare Threat . (Washington,
DC: U.S. Government, 1995), 34.
In the course of history, biological agents have taken
more human lives than the actual war or battle itself.
Appenix B will clearly illustrate this point. The world is
constantly reminded of these biological problems of the past
and present through military, economic, and environmental
events, but policies still do not reflect the dangers of
these devastating "killers".
Biological agents are direct threats to world security.
When these agents are employed in military situations, more
deaths will occur. As nations or non-state actors develop
their biological programs, accidents will occur that will
38
instantly effect the surrounding environment. When these
agents are employed, major problems will occur and the world
must be ready for them. This security threat brings new
global opportunities. NATO can be the driving factor
against the threat of biological agents.
B. DEVELOPING BIOLOGICAL AGENTS & WEAPONS
Biological warfare agents are relatively easy and
inexpensive to produce for any nation or non-state actor,
especially with pharmaceutical or fermentation capabilities.
Since materials for biological agent production are dual
use, equipment and technologies for the development of
biological agents are available in the commercial market and
training can be provided by equipment suppliers or
scientific meetings.
Developing biological agent production facilities can
be very attractive to nations and non-state actors.
Biological warfare facilities, whether declared or
undeclared, can be very small structures. Producing
biological agents with the capability to kill or
incapacitate thousands of people can be manufactured in
facilities of 25 m2 with no distinguishing characteristics. 45
45
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Dialogue Vol. 26. (Livermore, California: Sage Publications, 1995), 385.
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The required equipment and other materials to produce
biological agents would only cost several thousands of
dollars and can be manufactured practically by any nation. 46
If nations or non-state actors cannot manufacture these
items or find that it is much easier to purchase these items
from another country, commercial markets are readily
available to provide any assistance. 47 Since this equipment
is dual use, these pieces of equipment are also available in
medical and research facilities.
Biological agents can be produced with low or high
technological techniques. It depends on how much money a
nation or non-state actor is willing to provide for the
biological program and how discrete they wish to be for the
program. Table 4 illustrates key production techniques for
biological or toxin warfare agents.
46
Bailey, Kathleen C. "Responding to the Threat of Biological Weapons", Security
Dialogue . Vol.26. (Livermore, California: Sage Publications, 1995), 385. Appendix C provides
an illustration on producing biological agents by fermentation.
47Appendices D, E, and F illustrate over 300 confirmed and unconfirmed worldwide
manufacturers of biological related equipment such as fermenters, centrifugal seperators, and
freeze dryers to include Australian group countries and non-Australian group countries.
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Table 4: Key Production Techniques for BTW Agents









Cultivation in eggs, mouse
brains, or tissue culture
(roller bottles)
Culture in mammalian
cells grown on beads,
microcarriers, or hollow
fibers
Protein Toxins Batch fermentation and
purification of a bacterial
toxin, or extraction of
toxin from a plant or
animal source





Extraction from plant or
animal source
Cloning of a series of
genes, each governing
production of one of the
enzymes needed to
complete a step in the
blosynthetic pathway
Source: U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Technologies Underlying
Weapons ofMass Destruction , OTA-BP-ISC-115 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government
Printing Office, December 1993), 91.
Biological warfare agents do not take long to manufacture
and large amounts of these agents can be produced in a
matter of days.
Although some biological facilities establish the
internationally agreed biocontainment levels when producing
and handling biological agents, not all facilities follow
the protective levels. 48 As nations develop certain
biological agents, they may believe that other nations do
48There are four internationally agreed biocontainment levels designed for protecting those
handling biological agents. Each level represents the number of physical barriers that prevent an
organism from escaping to the outside from the handling area Level four is the highest level of
protection. For more information see The Chemical and Biological Warfare Threat
.
(Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1995), 28-29.
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not have the proper facilities to handle certain biological
agents. Not all nations or non-state actors use these
biocontainment levels when developing biological agents.
Figure 1 illustrates the four standard biocontainment levels
when developing or handling biological agents.
BL-1 , , BL-2
BL-3 BL-4
Sterilization of biohazards
Figure 1: Biocontainment Levels
Source: The Chemical and Biological Warfare Threat (Washington, DC: U.S.
Government Printing Office, 1995), 29.
The United Nations inspection teams were surprised after
inspectors revealed that crude biocontainment levels, even
at the BL2 level, were utilized by Iraqi researchers. 49
NATO cannot underestimate any nation or non-state actor from
developing biological weapons. Some nations or non-state
49
U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Technologies Underlying Weapons of
Mass Destruction . OTA-BP-ISC-115 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office,
December 1993), 92.
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actors might not allow safety precautions delay the
development of these weapons. 50
C. ACCESSIBILITY OF BIOLOGICAL AGENTS
The accessibility of biological agents is not a hard
task for nations or non-state actors. "Starter cultures"
can be obtained by stealing them from authorized facilities,
buying them on the black market or from authorized
facilities, receiving them from sponsored groups or nations,
extracting them from the natural environment, acquiring
samples from outbreak or sickening patients, or even mailing
an order to companies that supply organisms for legitimate
medical and research facilities. Nations or non-state
actors can penetrate these facilities if they really wanted
biological agents. The security systems inside U.S.
pharmaceutical and bio-technology facilities, for example,
are usually not as great as the high level external security
of these facilities. 51
In the past, professional trade journals routinely
advertised for the distribution of cultures requiring the
company providing the cultures the reason to believe that
50Appendix G illustrates the possible steps in acquiring a military biological or toxin
weapon capability.
51
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the recipient is properly trained and has the appropriate
facilities to handle the biological agents. 52 Now, anthrax
cultures cost approximately $45 from a U.S. storehouse
"requiring a signed form accepting responsibility for the
reciept and attesting to the existence of adequate
facilities and practices to work with potentially highly
pathogenic materials". 53
If nations or non-state actors choose not to deal with
biological facilities, they can acquire certain biological
agents from the natural resources. 54 Agents producing
anthrax, the plague, brucellosis, tularemia, and smallpox
are examples of those agents that can be isolated from
natural resources. Tricothecene mycotoxins can be derived
from corn, aflatoxin can be produced from peanuts, and ricin
can be produced from castor beans. 55 Due to the dual use
applications of biological agents, nations or non-state
actors can acquire the needed supplies from readily
"Douglass Jr., Joseph D and Neil C. Livingstone. America the Vulnerable: The Threat of
Chemical and Biological Warfare
. (Lexington, Massachusetts: Lexington Books, 1987), 25.
53The Chemical and Biological Warfare Threat . (Washington, DC: U.S. Government
Printing Office, 1995), 31. The cultural storehouses can supply different biological cultures,
frozen or freeze-dried, to include anthrax and Clostridium botulinum.
54Douglass Jr., Joseph D. and Neil C. Livingstone. America the Vulnerable: The Threat of
Chemical and Biological Warfare
. (Lexington, Massachusetts: Lexington Books, 1987), 23.
"Biological agent "recipes" can be obtained through open source documents. An example
is Douglass/Livingstone's America the Vulnerable , pp. 23-24
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available facilities.
D. POSSIBLE DELIVERY SYSTEMS FOR BIOLOGICAL AGENTS
The full range of delivery systems must be taken into
account when evaluating the overall proliferation
capabilities of nations or non-state actors. Possible
delivery systems for biological agents vary from the release
of infected animals to warheads on a ballistic missile.
From Appendix B, the main delivery systems for biological
agents involve rudimentary methods such as catapulting dead
infected bodies, trading contaminated materials, releasing
agents while testing, releasing infected animals,
contaminating food and water supplies, using bombs and
rockets, using bulbs in subway stations, using spring type
umbrellas, and using modified drop tanks. These rudimentary
delivery systems have proven to be very effective. The more
sophisticated delivery systems, such as warheads for
ballistic missiles, contained biological agents, but never
employed against other forces. It's only a matter of time
when these crude delivery systems turn into more
sophisticated delivery systems such as ballistic missiles.
The problem with most delivery systems is that they are
widely available on the international market.
A possible scenario could utilize the unmanned aerial
45
vehicles (UAVs) or model type airplanes capable of releasing
biological agents. With the Navy's new role in littoral
warfare, ships will operate close to land. This provides a
perfect opportunity, especially at night, for a nation or
non-state actor to employ biological agents against military
forces. These delivery systems can pollute the surrounding
air while depositing the biological agents on the surface of
the naval vessel allowing the crew to carry the agents
within the skin of the ship and contaminate a majority of
the crew.
A second possible scenario could involve the
contamination of food supplies destined for military
platforms while in overseas ports. While these food
supplies are being prepared for delivery, nations or non-
state actors could easily contaminate the food prior to
loading onboard military platforms, such as naval vessels.
This method could also be used against an import or export
of crops crippling the economy of that particular nation.
Another possible scenario could involve the
contamination of Turkish water resources. 56 With the lack
of water in Iraq and Syria, other nations or non-state
actors could contaminate the Turkish water resource, which
56Example from Butts, Kent Hughes. "Environmental Security: What is DOD's Role?",
Strategic Studies Institute Review . (United States: U.S. Army College, May 28, 1993), 8
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supplies Iraq and Syria, in order to initiate a conflict in
the region.
E. PROBLEMS WITH BIOLOGICAL WARFARE DETECTION
Detecting biological agents or biological warfare
programs are serious worldwide problems. The dual use
nature and potential illicit activities involving biological
agents as well as the nature of biological agents themselves
only encourage nations or non-state actors to utilize
biological agents as possible weapon systems. Small
biological facilities with limited staffs add to the list of
problems when trying to detect biological installations.
Biological agents and the threat of biological warfare
jeopardizes the international security. Biological agents
have the potential to cause military, political, economic,
and environmental insecurities throughout the world. NATO
must intensify its efforts against the proliferation of
biological agents and weapon systems.
47
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IV. BIOLOGICAL AGENTS AND TERRORISM
The second reason why NATO should magnify all efforts
against the proliferation of biological weapons and their
means of delivery is the threat of terrorist activities
involving biological weapons. NATO must face the
realization that terrorist groups have the capabilities of
producing and acquiring biological agents for employment
against their targets. Biological terrorism can affect
civilian populations, military forces and installations,
water supplies, commercial industries, and medical
facilities. As world medical and research facilities strive
to control the biological agents in their natural state,
terrorist groups or non-state actors will strive to gain an
advantage by having biological weapon capabilities.
Currently, the world is battling the effects of biological
agents due to various outbreaks. These outbreaks have
caused many problems throughout the world. As non-state
actors notice these problems, they will realize that
biological agents and weapons are a perfect combination for
their particular organizations.
The Alliance is not embodied in a titanium fortress.
Terrorism can strike at any place, any time. 5 " Billy Payne,
""Terrorism is the unlawful use of force or violence against persons or property to
intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population or any segment thereof, in furtherance
49
head of the Atlanta Olympic Committee, stated that "the city
would be the safest place on the planet" during the 1996
Olympic Games. 55 Even with military troops, explosive
detectors, and the latest bomb technology, a simple pipe
bomb exploded within the Olympic city killing one and
injuring hundreds. This could have easily been substituted
with a biological weapon from a non-state actor. It is the
responsibility of the Alliance to provide security and peace
for its members. NATO must face the seriousness relating to
the threat of non-state actors with biological weapon
capabilities. General Binford Peay stated that "terrorism
is changing and the next attack could be a vial of anthrax
thrown over the perimeter". 59 After the terrorist attack in
Saudi Arabia against American military forces, the Defense
Secretary William J. Perry announced the possibility of
of political or social objectives." This definition was cited in Holms, John Pynchon with Tom
Burke. Terrorism: The Complete Book of Terrorist Groups. Their Deadly Weapons. Their
Innocent Targets, and Their Terrible War Crimes (New York: Pinnacle Books and Windsor
Publishing Corp, 1994), 1.
58
Billy Payne was cited in Sherwood, Ben "No Safe Place", New York Times . July 27,
1996
59General Binford Peay, CINC ofUSCENTCOM, was cited in "USA & Saudi Must
Bridge Gap to Counter Terrorism Says Perry", Jane's Defence Weekly . Vol. 26, No. 3 (United
Kingdom: Jane's Information Group Limited, July 17, 1996), 18. General Peay made this
statement at a July 9, 1996 hearing of the Senate Armed Services Committee.
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groups having biological weapons. 60 NATO cannot allow these
groups to have the upper hand. NATO must highlight
biological warfare in their policies and demand the support
from fellow nations. Winning these battles is a team
effort
.
Currently, there are seven nations accused of aiding
terrorists: Syria, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Sudan,
and Cuba. bl From this list of "terrorist aiding" nations,
five nations are possibly involved in offensive biological
weapons programs: Syria, Iran, Iraq, Libya, and North
Korea. 6 - Not only can these nations aid terrorist groups or
other nations with biological weapons to threaten the
securities and freedoms of nations around the world, they
also have the capability to employ biological agents at long
ranges. Since ballistic missiles are considered to be a
delivery system for biological agents, Appendix H is
60
U.S. Defense Secretary, William J. Perry, was cited in "U.S. to Upgrade Security of
Forces in Saudi Arabia", New York Times . July 18, 1996. The article also states that Iran and
Iraq have called for the overthrow of the Saudi government. Both Iran and Iraq are currently on
the nations who support terrorism list and nations involved with an offensive biological weapons
program list.
61
Associated Press. "U.S. Accuses 7 Nations of Aiding Terrorists", New York Times
.
May 1, 1996.
62These nations are among the list of nations involved in possible offensive biological
weapons programs cited in U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment. Technologies
Underlying Weapons ofMass Destruction , OTA-BP-ISC-115. (Washington, DC: U.S.
Government Printing Office, December 1993), 239.
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provided to illustrate the current and future ranges of
their ballistic missile systems.
A. BIOLOGICAL WEAPON ATTRACTION TO TERRORIST GROUPS
Terrorists with biological weapons is not a recent
discovery. The combination of biological agents and weapon
systems dates back to the early 1960's. Biological weapons
have been very attractive to terrorist groups and will
continue to increase in the present environment. There are
many reasons why biological agents are attractive to
terrorist groups. Some of these attractions are due to:
(a) the availability and low cost of the agents and
equipment as compared to nuclear and chemical
materials,
(b) the relative ease of producing, acquiring, or
employing the agents,
(c) the lethality of the agents,
(d) the undetectability of the agents,
(e) the small amounts of agent needed to produce
enormous problems for the target, and
(f) the large amount of fear from the populations that
these agents create.
From Appendix B, terrorist groups seem to focus upon
four main attractions: the ability to cause fear in the
general population, the accessibility of biological agents,
the relative ease of producing biological agents, and the
relative ease of employing biological agents. These
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attractions as well as the others mentioned above cannot be
overlooked by NATO. NATO must establish policies that
discourage terrorist groups from these attractions and
create fears for those groups thinking about having
biological weapon capabilities. NATO could highlight the
unpredictability of biological agents, the dangers to
personal safety, and the hazards of producing, storing, and
employing biological agents.
B. TRENDS OF TERRORIST ACTIVITIES INVOLVING BW
NATO cannot underestimate the current trends of
biological agents falling into the hands of terrorist
groups. After analyzing the past three decades of Appendix
B, the threat of biological terrorism is increasing despite
the relatively low occurrences of the use or threat of
employing biological agents within the current decade. The
reasons for the relatively low reported occurrences are the
advances in biotechnology and learning experiences from the
past two decades.
In the 1970 's, terrorist groups were experimenting with
various biological agents in the bacterial, rickettsial, and
toxin categories. These agents include typhoid, anthrax,
botulism toxin, and ricin. Not only were terrorist groups
producing biological agents, they were also employing
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biological agents with unsophisticated delivery systems and
methods. The delivery systems and methods included
contaminating water resources, sending infected carriers in
the mail, and injecting individuals with an umbrella gun.
Although only two individuals were reported to have died
from biological terrorism, terrorist groups illustrated the
desire to produce agents, threaten to use agents, and
actually use biological agents to carry out their missions.
In the 1980 's, terrorist groups continued to produce
and employ biological agents. They also attempted to steal
biological agents from medical or research facilities.
Biological agents within the bacterial, rickettsial, and
toxin categories were not the only agents of interest.
Terrorist groups expanded into the fungal category as well.
The delivery methods also expanded into the contamination of
food supplies and the Earth's surface.
The present decade is a little different than the past
two decades. With the biotechnological advances in this
decade, the reported cases involving biological terrorism is
decreasing. This does not mean that the threat of
biological terrorism is decreasing. Terrorist groups, such
as the Japanese Aum Shinrikyo cult, have recently
illustrated interest in obtaining viral agents. With this
current interest, terrorist groups have now portrayed
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interest in all areas of biological agents: bacterial,
viral, rickettsial, fungal, and toxin. Terrrorist groups
are currently using sophisticated biological equipment from
the domestic or international market and showing interest in
the more sophisticated delivery systems, such as aircraft
and drones, as well.
In March 1995, the Japanese Aum Shinrkyo cult was
involved in the Tokyo commuter train incident that claimed
12 lives and wounded over 5,000 other individuals. 63 This
represents a new dimension of terrorism that will become an
increasing security concern for the entire world. Although
this particular terrorist group employed chemical weapons,
other terrorist groups might view this occurrence as paving
the way to employ other weapons of mass destruction:
biological weapons.
The interesting points concerning the Japanese
terrorist group is that it attracted many university
graduates and successful professionals, possessed a
sophisticated biological weapons program, and disclosed the
network of members involving other nations. Some cult
members were graduates from leading Japanese universities
with scientific, medical, and engineering backgrounds and
63Drew, Christopher. "Japanese Sect Tried to Buy U.S. Arms Technology, Senator Says",
New York Times
. October 31, 1995.
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successful professionals with physics, chemistry, law, and
medical backgrounds. 64 After the police raid of the
Kamikuishiki compound, it was discovered that the cult had
biological agent capabilities. The police found advanced
DNA devices along with 160 large containers of peptone, a
solution used to cultivate bacterial agents, Clostridium
botulinum, and other microorganisms. 65 There was also
evidence that the cult attempted to obtain the ebola virus
as well as aircraft and drones for means of delivery
systems. 66 And the final point of interest involves the
extensive network of members linked to North Korea and
Russia, both of which are suspected of offensive biological
warfare programs. The cult had 10,000 members in Japan and
30,000 members in North Korea and Russia. 67 Its only a
matter of time before other terrorist groups illustrate such
dangerous capabilities.
^Croddy, Eric. "Urban Terrorism: Chemical Warfare in Japan", Jane's Intelligence
Review
. (United Kingdom: Huntcard Litho, November 1995), 520-523; Drew, Christopher.
"Japanese Sect Tried to Buy U.S. Arms Technology, Senator Says", New York Times . October
31, 1995.
65Croddy, Eric. "Urban Terrorism: Chemical Warfare in Japan", Jane's Intelligence
Review (United Kingdom: Huntcard Litho, November 1995), 522
^Douglass Jr., Joseph D. "Chemical and Biological Warfare Unmasked", Wall Street
Journal




C. CHARACTERISTICS OF POTENTIAL GROUPS USING BW
Determining which group would actually use biological
weapons is a difficult task. After analyzing Appendix B,
there are certain characteristics associated with groups
using biological weapons. First, the group would not be
"concerned with the moral implications or the potential
backlash" associated with biological weapons. 68 Second, the
group would illustrate the willingness to take risks dealing
with hazardous weapons. Third, the group would portray the
willingness to challenge the security systems of medical or
research facilities around the world to acquire biological
materials. Fourth, the group would demonstrate the
willingness and capability to use sophisticated or
unsophisticated weapon systems against their targets.
Fifth, the group would demonstrate the ability to cause
death or incapacitate their intended targets and the
possibility of innocent victims.
NATO must ban together to challenge the threat of
biological terrorism. Ensuring the utilization of every
available asset is critical when confronting the biological
warfare threat. As the world struggles with various
outbreaks caused by biological agents, terrorist groups will
68Simon, Jeffrey D. Terrorists and the Potential Use of Biological Weapons: A Discussion
of Possibilities. R-3771-APMIC. (California: RAND Corp, December 1989), vi.
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realize that biological agents provide an advantage for
their particular groups. Striving for a more secure and
peaceful environment is a team effort. Individual nations
of NATO cannot challenge this threat by themselves. NATO
must change its policies towards biological warfare and all
members of NATO must support actions against those nations
or groups who sponsor or utilize biological agents and
weapons for terrorist activities.
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V. INTELLIGENCE INVOLVING BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
Intelligence is highly significant in every aspect of
biological warfare. The threat of biological warfare from
nations or non-state actors must install a strong sense of
concern for all intelligence agencies. Without prior
intelligence or early warning, any biological attack has a
high percentage of success. Worldwide intelligence groups
must increase their involvement towards the nonproliferation
of biological weapons before this increasing threat becomes
uncontrollable
.
NATO must know the capabilities of other nations and
non-state actors.
Know the enemy and know yourself, in a hundred
battles you will never be in peril. When you are
ignorant of the enemy but know yourself, your
chances of winning and losing are equal. If
ignorant of both your enemy and of yourself, you
are certain in every battle to be in peril. 69
The Alliance has the responsibility to protect its forces
and territories. If NATO becomes complacent when dealing
with the threat of biological warfare, surrounding nations
and non-state actors will take advantage of the situation.
The intelligence agencies within the Alliance must share
information and intelligence gathering methods to combat
69Sun Tzu cited in Joint Publication 2-0: Joint Doctrine for Intelligence Support to
Operations . (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, October 12, 1993), IV-9.
59
this probable nightmare.
Since biological weapons production and storage
facilities can be disguised as commercial, pharmaceutical,
medical, or research projects, intelligence agencies can
provide the customer with a wealth of knowledge to fight
against biological warfare. There are four main reasons why
intelligence is such a significant factor when dealing with
biological warfare: defusing threats and proliferation
incentives, deterrence against biological weapons,
destruction of biological facilities, and defense against
biological weapons. 70 First, intelligence can defuse
threats or proliferation incentives by "providing accurate,
timely, and convincing threat detection and assessments,
brokering disputes between states, and sharing technology to
improve stability when proliferation occurs". 71 As nations
or non-state actors proliferate such WMD, the biological
arms race would pose numerous worldwide risks and dangers.
Second, intelligence can deter against the proliferation and
employment of biological weapons by "building accurate
intelligence assessments for the potential use, maintaining
credible deterrent threats to high value targets, and
70
Latter, Dr. Richard "The Increased Danger of Biological Weapons Proliferation", Jane's
Intelligence Review




providing credible defense, recovery, and protective
capabilities". 72 Third, intelligence can provide pertinent
information in destroying biological facilities by
"gethering tactical intel for targeting and damage
assessment". 73 Accurate intelligence can reduce the
possibilities of infecting individuals while destroying
biological facilities. Fourth, intelligence can improve the
defensive measures by "providing accurate and timely early
warning and attack assessments, supplying effective passive
protection measures, and using effective defensive and
interdiction capabilities". 74
A. INTELLIGENCE UNDERESTIMATES
There are two recent disclosures of intelligence
underestimates that should encourage NATO to highlight the
increasing threat of biological warfare and intelligence
agencies to increase their efforts towards biological
warfare: (1) the extensive Iraqi offensive biological
weapons capabilities and (2) the extensive Russian
biological weapons research programs. Both of these nations
72
Latter, Dr. Richard. "The Increased Danger of Biological Weapons Proliferation", Jane's
Intelligence Review
.






have signed and ratified the BTWC and allegedly comitted
violations of the agreement. NATO must put a stop to the
proliferation of biological weapons.
1 . Iraq
The first disclosure of an intelligence underestimation
involves Iraq, a signatory who ratified the BTWC in 1972.
Although intelligence was gathered on Iraq's ability to
produce biological agents and test limited biological
weapons, Iraqi advancements in the biological weapons field
shocked intelligence agencies. In December 1991, Iraq
filled 150 gravity bombs and 25 medium range missile
warheads with botulinum toxin and anthrax, and 16 additional
bombs were filled with aflatoxin which were relocated from
Al Muthanna to two air force bases and a missile launch site
for possible employment against U.S. and coalition forces. 75
Not only did the Iraqis inform agencies about the loaded
missiles, but they also informed agencies about the
increased anthrax production and delivery systems. Iraqi
officials confessed that ten times more anthrax was produced
vice the original amount reported and the development of
drone type aircraft were capable of spraying agents into the
air. 76 During the invasion of Kuwait, the Pentagon
73Arms Control Today . "Iraq Provides IAEA With Significant New Information". Vol.
25, No 7. (Washington, DC: Arms Control Association, September 1995), 27.
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officials diminished "Iraq's ability to use biological and
toxin agents". 77 Intelligence agencies should have been
well aware of Iraq's biological capabilities prior to
Persian Gulf War. Military forces would have been better
prepared against a biological attack. Saddam Hussein
claims to have destroyed biological agents after the Persian
Gulf War, but has failed to produce any evidence
illustrating such actions. The Iraqi president continues to
block U.N. inspectors from entering buildings suspected of
containing banned weapons. The United Nations estimate that
Iraq purchased 39 tons of growth media before 1990 in which
every ton can yield ten tons of bacteriological weapons. 78
Intelligence agencies must strive to accurately pinpoint
these hazardous locations. Seventeen of the 39 tons of
growth media, amounts that can kill 50-60 million
individuals, are still unaccounted by the inspection
teams , 79
76
Ibid. 27 & 32. Iraqi officials admitted to these biological advances due to the
defections of Saddam Hussein's two son-in-laws: LTGEN Hussein Kamel Hassan and Saddam
Kamel Hassan who were responsible for developing WMD. For more information see Crossette,
Barbara. "Iraq Probably Hiding Arms, ChiefUN. Inspector Says", New York Times . June 13,
1996.
77
Tucker, Jonathan B. "Lessons of Iraq's Biological Weapons Programme", Arms
Control
. Vol. 14, No. 3. (London: Frank Cass, December 1993), 241.
78
Bruce, James. "Playing Hide and Seek With Saddam", Jane's Defence Weekly . Vol. 25,





The second diclosure of an intelligence underestimation
involves the Russian Federation which has signed and
ratified the BTWC and is a member of NATO's pfp program.
Throughout the Cold War, Russian biological research
programs, such as the Sverdlovsk research facility and the
Biopreparat program, were very active.
In April 1979, an accidental release of anthrax from
the Microbiology and Virology Institute in Sverdlovsk city
caused many casualties and approximately 100 deaths between
seven to ten days. 80 An estimated ten kilograms of anthrax
spores were released in a two to three mile radius. 81
Vaccinations and antibiotic treatments were administered to
the victims, but it was too late. The Soviet government
denied the presence of a biological research facility and
claimed the outbreak was caused by anthrax contaminated
meat.
The Biopreparat program is the most significant
biological research facility in Russia. This program began
with a bright Russian scientist named Vladimir Pasechnik.
Pasechnik was the senior director of the Institute of Highly
80DIA. Soviet Biological Warfare Threat . DST-1610F-057-86. (Washington, DC: U.S.




Pure Biopreparations between 1975 and 1989. 82
Pasechnik's goals were for peace, not for the
development of destructive weapons. But in 1974, the Soviet
Ministry of Defense offered Pasechnik a job to organize a
laboratory with unlimited funding: the beginning of the
Biopreparat program. 83 Naturally, Pasechnik accepted the
offer and began his work, unaware of the Soviet scheme and
the BTWC agreement. 84 He slowly became a pawn for the
Soviet military. After years of research, the Soviet
government ordered Pasechnik to develop new diseases that
were resistent to antibiotics of NATO forces and research
the effectiveness of military type delivery systems. 85 As
the number of laboratories expanded and stockpiles of
biological agents increased, Pasechnik became uncomfortable
about his role as a research scientist within this
particular program.
82Vladimir Pasechnik was interviewed on BBC News Night
,
January 21, 1993.
83The Sunday Times News Review . "The Untold Story of Russia's Secret Biological
Weapons Program". March 27, 1994.
84According to Pasechnik's interview on January 21 ,1993, he became aware of the BTWC
agreement after he arrived in the West.
850ther locations for biological research included Obolensk which researched lethal new
bacteria, Koltsevo which researched viruses, Chekhov which researched ways of protecting their
troops from biological agents, and Leningrad - St. Petersburg which researched agents more lethal
power (genetic plague and tularemia). These locations were cited during the January 21, 1993
interview.
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Paechnik knew the program was leaning toward military
applications and decided to expose the program in other
societies, particularly the West, in order to dismantle the
program. When the Biopreparat began bargaining with
manufacturing facilities in Toulouse, France in 1989,
Pasechnik, with defecting intentions, volunteered to assist
in finalizing the deal. Without knowing Pasechnik' s true
intentions, the government granted his request and when the
Soviet group arrived in France, Pasechnik called the British
embassy and eventually defected. The secrets of the Soviet
biological weapons program now became headline news.
According to Pasechnik during the news interview, the
Biopreparat also discussed issues relating to terrorism. He
acknowledged the fact that the program could be useful for
terrorist activities for the following reasons: the
production of the biological agents and weapons were
relatively easy and the difficulty to discover which nation
or non-state actor was involved with a biological attack.
This program extended well beyond the Soviet boundaries.
Despite the denial of a program to develop biological
or toxin weapons by President Gorbachev on June 8, 1990,
President Yeltsin admitted to the research in biological
warfare programs and issued a decree designed to end the
66
Biopreparat program in April 1992. 86 Lawrence Eagleburger,
former U.S. Secretary of State, believes that Yeltsin does
not have total control or authority over all Russian
activities which indicates the possibility of covert
biological research activities. 87 He also believes that
these programs could exist since Russian biologists need
money to support their families and that there is a
"conservative element unhappy with the detente between
Russia and the West.
Nuclear and chemical weapons seem to receive more
attention in the professional literature than biological
weapons. The intelligence communities within the Alliance
have definitely underestimated the biological programs of
certain nations and non-state actors. Without prior
intelligence and early warning, any biological attack has a
high probability of success. Prior intelligence and early
warning of biological attacks allows the target to use
protective measures. NATO intelligence groups must increase
their efforts towards biological warfare. If biological
warfare programs of Iraq and Russia have been
underestimated, then what is the real biological program
status of other nations or non-state actors suspected
86




offensive biological warfare programs?
B. ROLE OF HUMAN INTELLIGENCE (HUMINT)
Specific attention should be given to the role of human
intelligence (HUMINT) . Although technology has its
advantages and verification methods for detecting biological
weapons are problematic, HUMINT can play a vital role in the
intelligence process. HUMINT agents can be positioned in
embassies, universities, commercial companies, and even
transportation services. It provides the enormous reporting
advantage without the requirement of interpretation.
When dealing with collection, analysis, and covert
action of the intelligence system, each one of these
elements have to be carefully integrated. Each component
affects the performance of the other components. The
elements of HUMINT improves the collection, analysis, and
covert action components of the intelligence system.
First, collection is the process of gathering
information to support decision making. To utilize this
particular element effectively, the intelligence group must
know the limitations and capabilities of the accessible
resources. Having information from all available sources
creates a complete intelligence package. When HUMINT is not
present in the collection process, two major problems exist:
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(1) if the collection process does not include human
resources to verify received information, the agency will
only open the door for deception. HUMINT can provide
information on technological targets or equipment in
"hidden" areas and (2) if the collection process only
includes a technological element, what happens when the
weather causes problems with the equipment? HUMINT is
needed to provide the additional information. Utilizing all
available intelligence sources is the key to successful
collection activities.
Second, analysis is the process of converting "raw"
information into usable intelligence to support the decision
making process. Timeliness and accuracy are very
significant aspects during this process. When HUMINT is not
present in the analysis process, one fundamental problem
exists: verifying received information from other
intelligence sources. Information could have been provided
by a double agent. Technological sources, for example,
could provide developed film, copied images, or converted
messages, but verifying that information through human
resources will decrease any chance of deception. HUMINT
provides that necessary "second look".
Third, covert action is the process of influencing
events in another state without revealing own involvement
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usually in the form of propaganda, intelligence assistance,
political assistance, or forceful activity. When HUMINT is
not present in the covert action process, three major
problems exist: (1) the protection of counterintelligence,
with HUMINT, is necessary in avoiding the risk of
manipulation or exposure by other intelligence services, (2)
HUMINT involvement establishes the secrecy of such actions
against other states. Technological means of covert action
create a more noticeable operation which could be avoided
with HUMINT sources and (3) HUMINT assists in ensuring that
the correct government or group is influenced. HUMINT
sources can provide propaganda and disseminate
disinformation to influence the target.
The role of HUMINT in improving the intelligence
process includes overt and covert operations. Overtly,
attaches could interview military contacts or even militant
radicals, agents could interview possible candidates in
suspected organizations, and inspection teams could que
signals intelligence (SIGINT) operations or tip other HUMINT
agents. Covertly, official agents within an embassy could
monitor any proliferation efforts and non-official agents
could spread propaganda or unrealistic information about
suspected biological events. Monitoring suspected
biological facilities provides estimated stockpiles of
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biological weapons or attempts to transfer biological
weapons for possible use.
When dealing with collection, analysis, and covert
action elements of the intelligence system, each one of
these elements have to be carefully integrated. If the
elements are not integrated properly, problems will occur.
This clearly illustrates the complexity of the intelligence
system and the importance of utilizing all available
information and methods in creating the final product for
success against the proliferation of biological agents,
equipment, and weapons.
C. INTEGRATING INTELLIGENCE FINDINGS
The key to success is the proper combination of
intelligence gathering sources and the swift process and
dissemination of accurate data throughout the organization.
The Joint Deployable Intelligence Support System ( JDISS)
,
with its intelligence link capability, serves as the global
information gateway. This system allows nations, units, and
individuals the access of pertinent information. JDISS
capabilities include: "on-demand imagery and tactical
intelligence on selected areas and targets, real-time
information to transfer up, down, and across echelons,
regardless of service, responsive and secure communications
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with operational commanders, intelligence 'smart-push'
database updates, and intelligence 'demand-pull' linked to
onboard servers. 88 Intelligence relating to biological
warfare should be separated between classified and
unclassified information in order for military, civilian,
research, and academic organizations to develop new ideas on
combatting the threat of biological warfare. JDISS is the
link needed to combine all efforts towards fighting against
biological warfare. Nations, with this outstanding
information capability, can work as teams to decrease the
threat of biological warfare.
Intelligence provides specific details of the target
which is the cornerstone in the planning process. With the
support of other agencies, intelligence gathering will
involve a wide variety of resources ranging from human
contacts to satellite projects. Each of these resources
provides its own variety of capabilities, methods, and
sophistication. There might be some overlap in the process,
but more information is better than not having enough
information. The goal for any agency is establishing the
proper mix of sensors and sources for better intelligence
results
.
880ffice of Naval Intelligence. Naval Intelligence: Ready For Joint Operations .
(Washington DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1995), 10.
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VI . CONCLUSION
The end of the Cold War unleashed a number of troubling
developments in the world, especially the proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction. Currently, nations as well as
non-state actors are willing to buy or sell the technologies
necessary to produce biological weapons that threaten the
military, economy, and environment. Biological weapons are
an increasing threat to world security.
NATO's current policies regarding WMD do not highlight
the increasing threat of biological weapons. The threats of
biological warfare require the same amount of attention that
nuclear and chemical warfare receives within NATO policies.
When policies indicate a higher concern towards biological
warfare, intelligence agencies will increase their efforts
towards biological warfare as well. NATO must face this
dreadful challenge head on and continue to fight against the
threat of biological warfare in order to maintain the
security and peace of its members.
One reason why NATO should magnify all efforts against
biological warfare is the potential hazards associated with
biological agents. The world is battling against the rise
of infectious diseases and the biological agents seem to be
winning. As nations or non-state actors observe the
increasing problems created by the biological agents, they
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will realize that biological agents are proving to be an
outstanding weapon of choice. The possession of biological
agents for the use of biological weapons will have a direct
impact on worldwide operations. Nations and non-state
actors have accessibility to the necessary equipment for
producing these agents and to the biological agents
themselves. NATO cannot underestimate any nation or non-
state actor from developing biological weapons.
The second reason why NATO should magnify all efforts
against biological warfare is the threat of terrorist group
activities involving biological weapons. The threat of
biological terrorism is increasing. These groups have
illustrated their interest in all areas of biological
agents, sophisticated biological equipment, and
sophisticated delivery systems over the past three decades.
Intelligence exists because of policies set forth by
worldwide governments. NATO must change its policies
towards biological warfare. New policies would enhance the
efforts of intelligence agencies to "prevent acquisition,
cap or roll back existing programs, deter the use of
biological weapons, and ensure military forces can operate
against these weapons". 89 If policies change, then
89This is based upon a Col. Chuck Aldrich, USAF, brief on "Intelligence Issues in WMD:
Nonproliferation and Counterproliferation" on July 22, 1996 at the Naval Postgraduate School.
Col. Aldrich is currently Deputy Director of the DCI Nonproliferation Center, CIA.
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intelligence will refocus their efforts towards the new




CONVENTION ON THE PROHIBITION OF THE DEVELOPMENT, PRODUCTION,
AND STOCKPILING OF BACTERIOLOGICAL (BIOLOGICAL) AND TOXIN
WEAPONS AND ON THEIR DESTRUCTION
The States Parties to this Convention,
Determined to act with a view to achieving effective
progress towards general and complete disarmament, including
the prohibition and elimination of all types of weapons of
mass destruction, and convinced that the prohibition of the
development, production and stockpiling of chemical and
bacteriological (biological) weapons and their elimination,
through effective measures, will facilitate the achievement
of general and complete disarmament under strict and
effective international control,
Recognize the important significance of the Protocol
for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating,
Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of
Warfare, signed at Geneva on June 17, 1925, and conscious
also of the contribution which the said Protocol has already
made, and continues to make, to mitigating the horrors of
war,
Reaffirming their adherence to the principles and
objectives of that Protocol and calling upon all States to
comply strictly with them,
Recalling that the General Assembly of the United
Nations has repeatedly condemned all actions contrary to the
principles and objectives of the Geneva Protocol of June 17,
1925,
Desiring to contribute to the strengthening of
confidence between peoples and the general improvement of
the international atmosphere,
Desiring also to contribute to the realization of the
purposes and principles of the Charter of the United
Nations,
Convinced of the importance and urgency of eliminating
from the arsenals of States, through effective measures,
such dangerous weapons of mass destruction as those using
chemical or bacteriological (biological) agents,
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Recognizing that an agreement on the prohibition of
bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons represents a
first possible step towards the achievement of agreement on
effective measures also for the prohibition of the
development, production, and stockpiling of chemical
weapons, and determined to continue negotiations to that
end,
Determined for the sake of all mankind, to exclude
completely the possibility of bacteriological (biological)
agents and toxins being used as weapons, Convinced that such
use would be repugnant to the conscience of mankind and that
no effort should be spared to minimize this risk,
Have agreed as follows:
Article I
Each State Party to this Convention undertakes never in
any circumstance to develop, produce, stockpile or otherwise
acquire or retain:
(1) Microbial or other biological agents, or toxins
whatever their origin or method of production, of types and
in quantities that have no justification for prophylactic,
protective or other peaceful purposes;
(2) Weapons, equipment or means of delivery designed to




Each State Party to this Convention undertakes to
destroy, or to divert to peaceful purposes, as soon as
possible but not later than nine months after the entry into
force of the Convention, all agents, toxins, weapons,
equipment and means of delivery specified in article I of
the Convention, which are in its possession or under its
jurisdiction or control. In implementing the provisions of
this article all necessary safety precautions shall be
observed to protect populations and the environment.
Article III
Each State Party to this Convention undertakes not to
transfer to any recipient whatsoever, directly or
indirectly, and not in any way to assist, encourage, or
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induce any State, group of States or international
organizations to manufacture or otherwise acquire any of the
agents, toxins, weapons, equipment or means of delivery
specified in article I of the Convention.
Article IV
Each State Party to this Convention shall, in
accordance with its constitutional processes, take any
necessary measures to prohibit and prevent the development,
production, stockpiling, acquiring, or retention of the
agents, toxins, weapons, equipment and means of delivery
specified in article I of the Convention, within the
territory of such State, under its jurisdiction or under its
control anywhere.
Article V
Each State Party to this Convention undertake to
consult one another and to cooperate in solving any problems
which may arise in relation to the objective of, or in the
application of the provisions of, the Convention.
Consultation and cooperation pursuant to this article may
also be undertaken through appropriate international
procedures within the framework of the United Nations and in
accordance with its Charter.
Article VI
(1) Each State Party to this Convention which finds
that any other State Party is acting in breach of
obligations deriving from the provisions of the Convention
may lodge a complaint with the Security Council of the
United Nations. Such a complaint should include all
possible evidence confirming its validity, as well as a
request for its consideration by the Security Council.
(2) Each State Party to this Convention undertakes to
cooperate in carrying out any investigation which the
Security Council may initiate, in accordance with the
provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, on the
basis of the complaint received by the Council. The
Security Council shall inform the States Parties to the
Covention of the results of the investigation.
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Article VII
Each State Party to this Convention undertakes to
provide or support assistance, in accordance with the United
Nations Charter, to any Party to the Convention which so
requests, if the Security Council decides that such Party
has been exposed to danger as a result of violation of the
Convention.
Article VIII
Nothing in this Convention shall be interpreted as in
any way lisiting or detracting from the obligations assumed
by any State under the Protocol for the Prohibition of the
Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of
Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on June
17, 1925.
Article IX
Each State Party to this Convention affirms the
recognized objective of effective prohibition of chemical
weapons and, to this end, undertakes to continue
negotiations in good faith with a view to reaching early
agreement on effective measures for the prohibition of their
development, production, and stockpiling and for their
destruction, and on appropriate measures concerning
equipment and means of delivery specifically designed for




(1) The States Parties to this Convention undertake to
facilitate, and have the right to participate in, the
fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and
scientific and technological information for the use of
bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins for peaceful
purposes. Parties to the Convention in a position to do so
shall also cooperate in contributing individually or
together with other States or international organizations to
the further development and application of scientific
discoveries in the field of bacteriology (biology) for
prention of disease, or for other peaceful purposes.
(2) This Convention shall be implemented in a manner
designed to avoid hampering the economic or technological
development of States Parties to the Convention or
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international cooperation in the field of peaceful
bacteriological (biological) activities, including the
international exchange of bacteriological (biological)
agents and toxins and equipment for the processing, use or
production of bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins
for peaceful purposes in accordance with the provisions of
the Convention.
Article XI
Any State Party may propose amendments to this
Convention. Amendments shall enter into force for each
State Party accepting the amendments upon their acceptance
by a majority of the States Parties to the Convention and
thereafter for each remaining State Party on the date of
acceptance by it.
Article XII
Five years after the entry into force of this
Convention, or earlier if it is requested by a majority of
Parties to the Convention by submitting a proposal to this
effect to the Depositary Governments, a conference of States
Parties to the Convention shall be held a Geneva,
Switzerland, to review the operation of the Convention, with
a view to assuring that the purposes of the preamble and the
provisions of the Convention, including the provisions
concerning negotiations on chemical weapons, are being
realized. Such review shall take into account any new
scientific and technological developments relevant to the
Convention.
Article XIII
(1) This Convention shall be of unlimited duration.
(2) Each State Party to this Convention shall in
exercising its national sovereignty have the right to
withdraw from the Convention if it decides that
extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of the
Convention, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its
country. It shall give nmtice of such withdrawal to all
other States Parties to the Convention and to the United
Nations Security Council three months in advance. Such
notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events
it regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.
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Article XIV
(1) This Convention shall be open to all States for
signature. Any State which does not sign the Convention
before its entry into force in accordance with paragraph (3)
of this Article may accede to it at any time.
(2) This Convention shall be subject to ratification by
signatory States. Instruments of ratification and
instruments of accession shall be deposited with the
Governments of the United States of America, the United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Union
of Socialist Republics, which are hereby designed the
Depositary Governments.
(3) This Convention shall enter into force after the
deposit of instruments of ratification by twenty-two
Governments, including the Governments designated as
Depositaries of the Convention.
(4) For States whose instruments of ratification or
accession are deposited subsequent to the entry into force
of this Convention, it shall enter into force on the date of
the deposit of their instruments of ratification or
accession.
(5) The Depositary Governments shall promptly inform
all signatory and acceding States of the date of each
signature, the date of deposit of each instrument of
ratification or of accession and the date of the entry into
force of this Convention, and of the receipt of other
notices
.
(6) This Convention shall be registered by the
Depositary Governments pursuant to Article 102 of the
Charter of the United Naions.
Article XV
This Convention, the English, Russian, French, Spanish
and Chinese texts of which are equally authentic, shall be
deposited in the archives of the Depositary Governments.
Duly certified copies of the Convention shall be transmitted
by the Depositary Governments to the Governments of the
signatory and acceding states.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, duly authorized,
have signed the Convention.
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DONE in triplicate, at the cities of Washington,
London, Moscow, this tenth day of April, one thousand nine
hundred and seventy- two.
Source: GAO Report. Arms Control: U.S. and International Efforts to Ban Biological





AN HISTORICAL BIOLOGICAL AGENT DATA BASE
PRIOR TO 1910







Cholera Outbreak Cholera Environment # Deaths: Millions in Asia
Century
"Black Death" Bubonic Plague Environment # Deaths: Full quarter ofEurope
1346-1347 Mongol Conflict Bubonic Plague Military
and
Environment
The Tartars infected the Genoese by
catapulting infected bodies over the walls of
the Crimean seaport Caffa (Feodosija). The
plague also spread into Sicily, Sardinia,
Corsica, and Genoa as plague victims fled via
ships.
# Deaths: UNK
1710 Russo-Swedish War Bubonic Plague Military Reports of catapulting infected bodies into the
battlefield.
U Deaths: UNK
1741 Mexico & Peru
Incident
Yellow Fever Military English commander, Admiral Edward Vernon,
reported to have lost 20,000 of27,000 men
during the English attack to conquer Mexico
and Peru.
# Deaths: 20,000
1763 French-Indian War Smallpox Military Captain Ecuyer ofthe Royal Americans met
two indian chiefs and gave them Smallpox
infected blankets. A Smallpox outbreak
navigated through the tribes in Ohio.
# Deaths: UNK
1764 Smallpox Outbreak Smallpox Environment U Deaths: 1 / 1 of Swedish population
succumbed
1910 -1920




1914 World War I Epidemic Typhus Military
and
Environment
Typhus outbreak weakened the Russian
forces.
# Deaths: 3 million''' Russians
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intelligence operations attempted to infect
horses and mules.
# Deaths. UNK
1918-1919 Influenza Outbreak Influenza Military
and
Environment
This outbreak affected the forces at the end of
World War I and continued until 1919.
# Deaths: 20 million worldwide
1920 -1940




1936-1945 Japanese Biological Anthrax Military Approximately 2,000 POW's were used as
Program Plague and expermental guinea pigs. China claims that
Cholera Environment 1 1 cities were affected from the Japanese
and experiments with the Plague involving 700
Typhoid cases. The Japanese BW factory was located
near Harbin, in Manchuria.
# Deaths: UNK
1940-1950






Anthrax Military Britain intiated its Biological Weapons
program involving Anthrax. Tests were
conducted on Gruinard Island, Scotland near
Laide. These bombs released spores that
remained on the top 6-8 inches of soil for more
than 40 years.
# Deaths: UNK
1941 World War II Epidemic Typhus Military The Soviet Union claims that the Germans
used this disease against Soviet forces.
# Deaths: UNK
1941 World War II Various Agents Military Unit 731 under LTGEN Shio Ishii in
Manchuria killed 3,000 individuals involving
biological experiments. Most were Chinese,
Russian, British. Australian, and American
POW's. This unit also set up flea "nurseries"
for the production of 135 million plague-
infested fleas every 4 months. The delivery











Anthrax Military A pilot Anthrax production plant became
operational at Camp Detrick, MD. It
consisted of approximately 500 staff members.
This was created to produce large quantities of
Anthrax for use in a bombing campaign







Military A decision was made to build a full-scale plant
in Vigo, Indiana staffed with approximately
1,000 workers in order to produce 500,000
Anthrax bombs a month or 250,000
Botulinum Toxin bombs. The plant was





Foot and Mouth Disease
Virus
Environment This outbreak occurred in Mexico which
infected one-third of Mexico's cattle. 500,000
cattle were slaughter and thousands of others
were innoculated.
U Deaths. 500.000 cattle
1950 -1960






Bacteria Pathogens Military U.S. Congress voted to build a biological
production plant, the X-201, near Pine Bluff,





Cereal Rust Spores Military
and
Environment
The first anti-crop cluster bombs were placed
in production for the U.S. Air Force. Each
bomblet consisted of contaminated turkey
feathers (cereal rust spores)
# Deaths: N/A
1951 Korean War Plague Military Koreans claim the United States used the
Plague against Korean forces.
# Deaths UNK




Military Peking claims that biological warfare was




Junin Virus Environment This rodent-bome virus casuseds hemorrhagic
fevers which killed 1 of 5 victims by 1953.
Apparently, the urine and droppings in dust













The U.S. Army began developing a drone aircraft
capable of delivering 200 pounds of biological




Oropouche Virus Environment This outbreak caused flu-like symptoms in
1 1,000 individuals in Belgium and Brazil. This




Ebola Virus Environment Thirty-one individuals were infected with the
Marburg Ebola virus in West Germany and
Yugoslavia. The virus was transported by
Ugandan Green monkeys.
U Deaths: 7






The U.S. Army revealed the vulnerability ofNew
York City's subway system to a biological
attack. Aerial clouds of a harmless bacteria were
sprayed through sidewalk vents into subway
stations in Manhattan. Bacteria travelled by the
wind ofthe speeding trains throughout many
stations. In addition, light bulbs containing the
bacillus were tossed from the trains into subway
tunnels. Also, colored dye placed in water








Early 1970's United States Incident Various Bacteria Environment
and
Terrorism
An attempt by a U.S. leftest terrorist group.
Weather Underground, to blackmail a
homosexual officer at the U.S. Army
bacteriological warfare facility in Fort Detrick,
MD, into supplying organisms to contaminate the











Two college students charged with conspiracy to
commit murder for the plot to poison Chicago's
water supply system.
# Deaths: N/A






A German biologist threated to contaminate
water supplies with bacilli of Anthrax and









Various Agents Military The Russians initiated an intense biological
warfare program focussing against NATO and





Various Agents Military Iraqi officials increase research & development in





Various Agents Terrorism This group was discovered to possess military
technical manuals on how to produce biological




Ebola Virus Environment The Ebola outbreak infected individuals from
Zaire and neighboring Western Sudan.
# Deaths: 400+
1976 United States Incident Various Bacteria Terrorism Executives throughout the United States were
receiving "tick letters" which contained disease
infected ticks according to the accompanied
letter.
# Deaths: UNK




Environment The Rift Valley Fever epidemic spread through
Egypt's Nile River delta area infecting
approximately 10,000 individuals.
# Deaths UNK
1978 Water Supply Target UNK Environment
and
Terrorism
Threats were made to contaminate the water
supply of Phoenix, Arizona if extortion payments
were not made.
# Deaths N/A
1978 Bulgarian Incident Ricin Terrorism Ricin was used against two Bulgarian defectors.
Since shooting the two individuals would draw
unwanted attention, a Bulgarian agent filled an
umbrella with Ricin pellets to shoot them into the
legs ofthe victims.
# Deaths: UNK
1979 Sverdlovsk Explosion Anthrax Environment The Sverdlovsk explosion involving the Anthrax
agent caused political tension between the United
Kingdom. United States, and Russia. This




Clostridium Botulinum Terrorism West German reports indicate that the
Palestinians in Lebanon were training the leftist
RAF (Red Army Faction), remnants ofthe
Baader-Meinhof gang, to use biological agents.
A few years earlier, the Baader-Meinhof group
threatened to poison the water supply in 20 West
German towns if 3 radical lawyers were not
allowed to defend their comrades.
# Deaths: N/A
1970's Dengue Fever Virus
Outbreak
Dengue Fever Virus Environment This mosquito-bome tropical virus infected parts
ofthe population in Asia and Latin America
since the mid-70's. This virus appeared again in








Early 1980's Iran-Iraq War UNK Military Throughout the Iran-Iraq War, reports indicate the
usage of biological agents. This alarmed politicians




UNK Terrorism Two casinos were sent extortion notes demanding $10
million to prevent the poisoning oftheir water
supplies.
# Deaths: N/A
1980 Police Raid on
RAF Apartment
Clostridium Botulinum Terrorism The police raid ocurred in Paris and found a
miniature lab containing a medium culture of









Protestors deposited Anthrax spores, "seeds of death",
in the ground at the Chemical Defence Establishment
and at the Blackpool Tower. The spores were taken
from Gniinard Island. The protestors wanted the




Ricin Terrorism FBI arrested 2 brothers in northeastern United States
ofmanufacturing an ounce of nearly pure Ricin
which was stored in 35 mm film canisters.
# Deaths: N/A
1984 Canadian Incident Botulism
and
Tetanus
Terrorism Two Canadians were arrested in Buffalo, New York
for placing orders with a U.S. research firm for these
particular cultures. The 2 claimed to be
representatives for a research company that did not
exist.
# Deaths: N/A
1984 Australian Incident Foot & Mouth Bacteria Terrorism Australian authorities received an anonymous threat
warning that the bacteria would be released if reforms




Oregon Incident Typhoid Terrorsim The Rajneesh cult outside Antelope, Oregon was
reported to have contaminated the salad bars of local
restaurants in The Dalles, Oregon with Typhoid
which sickened 750 individuals in order to influence
a local election.











Static field tests and trials of an Anthrax simulant and







Typhoid Military The Kurds claim they were attacked with Typhoid
bombs in Sulaymaniyah by the Iraqis.
# Deaths: UNK
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1989 Ebola Outbreak Ebola Environment This outbreak occured in a primate center in Reston,
Virginia. For fear ofthe virus spreading to other
cities, the military was called for assistance to secure
the area and kill the 400 monkeys.
# Deaths: 400 monkeys
1989
(August)
Canadian Incident Fungas Fusarium Terrorism A Canadian vetrinary pathologist reported to have
received an Iranian pharmacologist request for 2
strains ofthe agent which is fatal to humans and
animals within 24 hours if ingested. The request was
denied. Another similar request by the same Iranian
"researcher" to the Central Bureau for Fungas









Additional tests involving biological weapons were




Clostridium Botulinum Terrorism A cell ofthe Bader-Meinhof gang was discovered









1990 (May) Iraqi Biological
Program
N/A Military Previous incidents involved the testing ofthe 122 mm
rocket with biological weapons. Now. additional
firings ofthe 122 mm rocket were conducted.
# Deaths: N/A


















Iraq produced 5.4 thousand liters of Botulism Toxin at
the Daura Foot & Mouth Disease Institute, 400 liters
of Botulism Toxin at the Taji facility, and 1 50 liters of









Military Large scale weaponization of biological agents
ocurred Iraqi military filled 150 bombs and 50
warheads with biological agents and transported to
forward locations. The Iraqis worked to adopt the
modified aircraft drop tank with biological agent spray
either to piloted fighter or remotely piloted aircraft
guided by piloted aircraft. The spray was designed for











Iraq produced 6,000 liters of Botulism Toxin and











Military Iraqi military weapons were illustrated as threats for













Hantaan Virus Environment The East Asian rodent-bome virus appeared in
Southwest United States involving 106 cases in which
50% were fatal. This virus was also reported in 23





Cryptosporidios Environment This outbreak occurred in the Milwaukee water supply








Unveilling information ofthe cult attempts to acquire a















Lassa Fever Virus Environment This virus causes African hemorrhagic fevers that
infects 200,000 - 400,000 individuals annually in West
Africa.














Meningitis Environment This outbreak ocurred in West Africa which blocked
pilgrimages.
# Deaths: 10,000+
1996 (April) Ebola Virus
Outbreak
Ebola Virus Environment The Ebola virus (Reston) outbreak occured in Texas.
Although this particular Ebola virus had no danger to
humans, 100 infectuous monkeys from the Philippines
were killed.
# Deaths: 100 monkeys
1996 May 96 Report Cholera Environment # Deaths: 1.3 million patients since 1991
1996 May 96 Report TB Environment The report estimates an increase in TB patients. There
is also an increase of a 58% death rate caused by






Cyclospora Environment The outbreak has made more than 1 thousand
individuals sick in 1 1 states (United States and
Canada). This has caught federal officials by surprise.
Guatemalan rasberries are linked to the outbreak.
Califomian strawberries were wrongly accused and the







O-l 57 Colon Bacillus Environment The outbreak occurred in Japanese schools (53 of92
primary schools in Sakai) and caused over 9,000
individuals to become ill. It also forced a widespread
canx of classes. It also caused the cancellation of
camping trips, athletic events, and summer festivals
forcing individuals inside since the transmission can be
from water. Warnings were issued about eating raw
meat throughout Japan. Researchers claim radish







Cholera Environment The outbreak occurred in Mongolia and infected 92
individuals. A total of 1,901 individuals remained in
quarantine. The virus has been traced to a military unit
in Khoetol, in northern Mongolia, and was probably






Bubonic Plague Environment The plague occurred in Santa Clara county. It has
been found in several wild animals (bobcats, wild pigs,
and coyote) in the mountains east of Gilroy. The
plague was passed via flea bites.
U Deaths
Sources adapted from: Altaian, Lawrence K. "Cyclospora Outbreak Poses Many
Puzzles", Monterey County Herald Tribune . June 30, 1996. pp. Al, A8; Associated Press.
"Cholera Strikes Mongolia", New York Times . August 19, 1996, Associated Press.
"Ebola in Texas Poses No Threat, Officials Say", New York Times . April 17, 1996,
Associated Press. "Ebola Killed 13 in Gabon, WHO. Says", New York Times . February
19, 1996, Associated Press. "Guatemala Rasberries are Linked to Parasite", Monterey
County Herald Tribune
. July 19, 1996, Associated Press. "Japan Says Radishes Caused
Food Poisoning", New York Times . August 8, 1996; Bruce, James. "Playing Hide and
Seek with Saddam", Jane's Defense Weekly . Vol. 25, No. 1. (United Kingdom:
International Thomson Publishing, January 3, 1996), 15-19, Cowley, Geoffrey. "Outbreak
of Fear". Newsweek . May 22, 1995. pp. 48-55; DIA. Soviet Biological Warfare Threat .
(Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1986), 4-7, Douglass, Joseph D. Jr.
"Chemical and Biological Warfare Unmasked", Wall Street Journal . November 2, 1995;
Douglass, Joseph D. Jr.and Neil C. Livingstone. America the Vulnerable: The Threat of
Chemical and Biological Warfare
. (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1987), 31-32;
CNN Presents
. "Apocalypse Bug", July 21, 1996, French, Howard W. "Wide Epidemic
of Meningitis Fatal to 10,000 in West Africa", New York Times . May 8, 1996; Geissler,
Erhard. Biological and Toxin Weapons Today . (Stockholm International Peace Research
Institute: Oxford University Press, 1986), 7-10, Goven, Gregory G. "An In-Depth Look
at On-Site Inspections", Arms Control Today . Vol. 25, No. 7 (Washington, DC: Arms
Control Association, September 1995), 27; Hanley, Charles J. "Infectious Diseases
Making Comeback", Monterey County Herald Tribune
. May 5, 1996, Jenkins, Brain M.
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and Alfred P. Rubin. "New Vulnerabilities and the Acquisition ofNew Weapons by
Nongovernment Groups", Legal Aspects of International Terrorism . (Lexington, MA:
Lexington Books, 1978), 228, Kupperman, Robert H. and Darrell M. Trent. Terrorism:
Threat. Reality. Response . (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institute Press, 1979), 46, Monterey
Co Herald . "Bubonic Plague Cases Found East of Gilroy". September 8, 1996, Mullins,
Wayman C. "An Overview and Analysis ofNuclear, Biological, and Chemical Terrorism:
The Weapons, Strategies and Solutions to a Growing Problem", American Journal of
Criminal Justice . 1992. pp. 100-101; Oehler, Dr. Gordon C. The Continuing Threat
from Weapons ofMass Destruction . (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing
Office, March 27, 1996), 4-13; Office ofthe Secretary of Defense. Proliferation: Threat
and Response . (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, April 1996), A-4;
Rose, Steven. CBW: Chemical and Biological Warfare . (Boston: Beacon Press, 1968),
52; Rothschild, J.H. Tomorrow's Weapons . (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company,
1964), 19-20; Simon, Jeffrey D. Terrorists and the Potential Use ofBiological Weapons:
A Discussion of Possibilities . (U.S. Armed Forces Medical Intelligence Center: Rand
Corporation, December 1989), 3, 6, 8-10, 18; Smith, James. "Biological Warfare
Developments", Jane's Intelligence Review . (United Kingdom: Huntcard Litho,
November 1991), 483-486; Sutton, Don. "Harmful fungi Requested by Iranian, Scientist
Says", Toronto Globe and Mail . August 14, 1989, Al; Tucker, Jonathan B. "Lessons of
Iraq's Biological Weapons Programme", Arms Control . Vol. 14, No. 3. (London: Frank
Cass, December 1993), 229-310, U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment,
Technology Against Terrorism: Structuring Security . (Washington, D.C.: U.S.
Government Printing Office, 1992), 40; U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment,
Technologies Underlying Weapons ofMass Destruction. OTA-BP-ISC-115 (Washington,
DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, December 1993), 79, 81, 88, 90, 94, 98, 99, 101;

















Source: U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Technologies Underlying
Weapons of Mass Destruction , OTA-BP-ISC-1 15 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government




CONFIRMED WORLDWIDE MANUFACTURERS of FERMENTERS















B Braun Australia Pty, Ltd.
Sulzer Australia Pty, Ltd.
Andritz Maschinenfabrik AG
Sulzer Belgium SA/NV
Pegasus Industrial Specialties, Ltd.
Sulzer Canada, Inc.
WHE Process Systems, Ltd.
Alfa-Laval AS
Chemap (made in Switzerland)
Inceltech
LSL Biolafitte SA
Sgi Setnc Genie Industnel
Alfa-Laval Industrie GmbH
B Braun Diessel Biotech GmbH
Chemap GmbH (made in Switzerland)





B Braun Milano SpA (made in
Germany)
B Braun Biotech Co., Ltd. (made in
Germany and Malaysia)
Marubishi Bioengineenng Co., Ltd.
Mitsuwa Rikagaku Kogyo Co., Ltd.










MBR Bio Reactor AG





Life Sciences Laboratories, Ltd.






Czech Republic and Slovakia
Russia and other NIS
South Korea
Sulzer do Brazil SA Industna e Comercio
Scientific Research Lab for Instrument
Making and the Automation of
Biological Expenments
Kralovopolska Stroyirna
All-Union Scientific Research Design
Institute of Applied Biochemistry
Institute of the Biochemistry and Physiology
of Microorganisms








UNCONFIRMED WORLDWIDE MANUFACTURERS of FERMENTERS



































Pharmacia LKB Instruments SA
Sonertec





Deutsche Metrohm GmbH & Co.





































Nisshin Oil Mills, Ltd.
Yakult Honsha Co., Ltd.








Netherlands Institute for Dairy Research
Pharmacia Nederland BV




















APV Barnetta Rolfe, Ltd.
B & P Biotechnology, Ltd.
BS Flocor, Ltd.
Catalytic International, Inc.












MacLeod & Miller (Engineers), Ltd.
Mass Transfer International














Centro de Technolgia Promon
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Faculdade de Engenhana Industnal
Setal Instalacoes Industrias SA
TECHPAR
Zanini SA Equipmentos
Czech Republic and Slovakia
China
Kovodruzhstvo
Microbiology Institute of the Czechoslovakia
Academy of Sciences
Yednotne Zemyedyelske Druzhestvo Rude
Armady
Beijmg Institute of Chemical Metallurgy
Dalian Institute of Chemical Physics





























Beckman Instruments Pty, Ltd.
Heraeus Wien

















Heigar & Co. AS
Nyegaard & Co. AS
Bergman & Beving AB
Alfa-Laval Industnegesellschaft AG




A. R. HorwelL Ltd.
Alfa-Laval Engineering, Ltd.
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APV Chemical Machinery, Ltd.







Eltex of Sweden, Ltd.







Simsons of Edinburgh, Ltd.
V. A. Howe & Co., Ltd.
Zeta Engineering, Ltd.
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AMKO Light Technology Instruments GmbH
Andreas Hettich
Berthold Hermle GmbH







Hewlett Packard Italian SpA
Fuji Filter Manufacturing Co., Ltd.
Hitachi Koki Co., Ltd.
Mitsubishi Kakoki Kaisha, Ltd.
Nippon Atomic Industry Group Co.
Shinmaru Enterprises Corp.











Moscow Production Institute of the Food
Industry
All-Union Scientific Research and
Expenmantal Design Institute of the
Food Machine Building Industry
Han Seong Machinery Manufacturing Co.
Korea Storage Battery Co.
Bestway Corp.
Chang Jung Business Company, Ltd.
Sui Sheng Refrigeration Engineering Co.
Yau Yuan Industrial Machinery Co.
Ukraine Kharkov Institute of Mechanization and
Electrification of Agriculture
Israel and the Republic of South Africa posseses the technological knowledge,
industrial capability, and infrastructure support to produce the most advanced
centrifuges.
India, Brazil, and Pakistan are also potential producers.
Source: The Chemical and Biological Warfare Threat . (Washington, DC:
U.S. Government, 1995), 39-40.
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APPENDIX F
CONFIRMED WORLDWIDE MANUFACTURERS OF FREEZE DRYERS












Leybold-Heraeus GmbH (Owned by
AMSCO)
Edwards High Vacuum Intl. (British Oxygen)
(Owned by AMSCO)
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Atlas (Manufactures automated tray loadmg
freeze dryers for the food industry)
Biolafitte
Froilabo Biomedical































Associated Instrument Mfg. (S), Ltd.
O.S.L. Sinko
Taiwan
Russia and other NIS
Best-way Corp.
Chang Jung Business Co., Ltd.
Fu Sheng Ind Co., Ltd.
Sui Sheng Refrigeration Eng. Co.
Yau Yuan Ind Machinery Co., Ltd.
Institute of the Problems of Cryobiology and
Cryomedicine
Source: The Chemical and Biological Warfare Threat . (Washington, D.C.:




































































tactical BW bame plans
1 ram troops to use B.'J







Source: U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Technologies Underlying
Weapons ofMass Destruction . OTA-BP-ISC-115 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government








Future Missil ! Delivery Systems
_ _
Long Range Missile 1,000
SCUDC
Source: Office of the Secretary of Defense Proliferation Threat and Response
(Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office. April 1996), 17.
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RANGES OF IRAQI BALLISTIC MISSILES IN DESIGN OR R&D PRIOR TO
OPERATION DESERT STORM
IRAQ
Missile System Range (Km)
Al Fahd 300 300
_ _
Al Fahd 500 500
. - - Al Abbas 950
__ Badr2000 1,000
_._ Tammouz I 2,000
I ?
Source: Office of the Secretary of Defense Proliferation: Threat and Response
(Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, April 1996), 22.
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Current Missile Delivery Systems Range (km)
___
SCUD B 300
Future Missile Delivery Systems
m — ai Fatah 200
— — Longer Range Missile 1 000
x*^*-" CENTRAL
AFRICAN REPUBLIC Boun,<lary representations ore not necfeyirtly aushoritalivo
Source: Office of the Secretary of Defense Proliferation: Threat and Response
(Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, April 1996), 28.
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RANGES OF CURRENT & FUTURE NORTH KOREAN BALLISTIC MISSILES
Source: Office of the Secretary of Defense. Proliferation: Threat and Response .
(Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, April 1996), 8.
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